However, I do not see a way to achieve this without massive compromise to security. That is, without either giving LE access without warrants and without making it much easier for criminals to get access.
> On the other hand if you imagine, "if there was a new algorithm for _stronger encryption_ but it didn't matter because all the cleartext was available for monitoring", it means you're thinking like the government.
I would indeed be in favor of giving the government publicly auditable and well secured access to cleartext uppon request. I just don't see a way to do this that works.
By auditable here, I mean that every single decryption that occurs should be publicly available. This could e.g. happen by requiring a secret key known only by the judiciary. With homomorphic encryption, you might even be able to do this stuff on a blockchain, but that is quite the pipe-dream.
Yes, it's plausible that the non-approved software stack on your phone isn't doing any illegal encryption, but that fails if having non-approved OS on your phone a crime by itself.
Yes, it's plausible that the TrueCrypt volume you have doesn't contain anything bad, but that fails if mere possession of TrueCrypt tools is a crime by itself.
Yes, it's plausible that the encrypted traffic sent to/from your phone didn't contain anything bad, but that fails if having any encrypted traffic not going through state-approved MITM https is a crime by itself.
Etc ad infinitum. Don't underestimate the coercive power of gov't if they actually want to restrict something. Technical means can protect you only if you physically live outside of their reach.
The point I'm trying to make is that in an oppressive regime the only thing that actually provides plausible deniability is having and using the exact same hardware/software as everyone else uses; a rooted phone with an opensource OS, unusual chat apps or cryptography tools won't give you any plausible deniability but actually make everything even more risky for you.
Yes, I agree with Patrick that framing the arguments on "math of encryption" is misguided. Yes, it leads to thinking that legislators are stupid similar to trying to pass a bill to redefine the value of pi.[1]
Let's be clear.... the lawmakers actually don't care if the most powerful supercomputers at NSA/GCHAQ can't crack WhatsApp's latest 2048-bit-quantum-elliptical-encryption used in conjunction with Apple iOS tamperproof enclave chip.
All that math doesn't matter. It's a mistake to think that government is retarded because "math is irreversible". That smugness makes people lose sight of the ultimate goal: the cleartext.
If getting that cleartext means new laws that require all Android/Apple phones include a software keyboard interceptor (the onscreen keyboard) to log keystrokes and send the cleartext to a government server, then so be it. Such a keystroke logger would then make the "irreversible math" a moot point.
Tldr: Don't frame the policy in terms of "encryption". Instead, focus on the "cleartext".
>The first problem actually has very little to do with end-to-end encryption and a lot more to do with access to messaging metadata.
This is true, but it's misleading because we know that governments eventually want more than the just the metadata.
>Now it’s all very well and good for WhatsApp to argue that it doesn’t have the technical means to do so, which is a response that has lead to all sorts of tangles in Brazil’s courts, but the Australian law will simply say “we don’t care. Get them.”.
This line dances close to what we really should be discussing (the cleartext). If you find yourself grumbling "the government wants to weaken encryption!", it means you're thinking like a computer scientist. On the other hand if you imagine, "if there was a new algorithm for _stronger encryption_ but it didn't matter because all the cleartext was available for monitoring", it means you're thinking like the government.
>Do we believe that law enforcement bodies should have the authority to monitor the communications of people suspected of serious criminal offences?
This question is another way of framing it which is closer to the aims of the government. They want to monitor the cleartext.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_Pi_Bill