This was discussed here: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/07/02/1
> a rare example of a real problem that was assigned a CVE number by request of someone other than the developer
It's fairly common that the security researcher requests CVE. CVE request by an affected distro (which is what happened here) isn't anything unusual either.
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/6300
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6277 (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14681377)
* https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2017-Ju...
You do not need to experience a breach in advance to have a hope of stopping a breach.
Besides, if people cared about security they'd use tools and languages and runtimes that help them test thst code works right. They don't, by and large.
Sure, people should audit their own tools, but there are also casual users. And there are indirect users. They are entitled to enjoy the better (if not perfect) security provided by battle hardened code.
I've even said above I agree with criticisms that systemd didn't plan and was deployed too early and too fast.
There are not fundamental design flaws. They don't have to be, to be a problem. And it's a problem exacerbated by the developers' typical response to problem reports -- to try to transfer blame, or treat them as personal attacks, rather than dealing with the issue. An example of that is CVE-2017-1000082 -- a rare example of a real problem that was assigned a CVE number by request of someone other than the developer, because the developers are still insisting, after a week of well-deserved mockery, that it's not a problem (or not their problem, or something)...
Refs:
Buffer overflow: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/29/systemd_pwned_by_dn...
Cache poisoning: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q4/592