There's surprisingly little info about this from the actual ports. Even Twitter output has become so PR-controlled that nobody involved is getting important information out. APM, Maersk, and the Port of Los Angeles all have Twitter feeds, and none of them have any useful info about this. Even the Port of Los Angeles Police have nothing.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has a clue. Their alerts feed has useful info.[1]
6/27/2017 4:30:08 PM
APM closed 6/28 & plan to open 6/29 6:00 am,
gate hours to 7:00 pm (cut off) 6/29 thru 7/7.
Free-time will be extended 2 days due to service impact.
(The free time extension means customers have two extra days to
bring back their empties before being charged.)
6/27/2017 1:14:23 PM
Due to extent of system impact, APM Terminals will not be opening
for the remainder of the day. Updates on tomorrow's status to follow.
6/27/2017 9:12:22 AM
APM is still experiencing system issues. Please delay arrivals.
6/27/2017 8:58:03 AM
APM Terminals is still experiencing system issues. Please
delay arrival until further notice. Updates will follow.
6/27/2017 7:53:09 AM
APM Terminals is experiencing system issues and working to
restore. Please delay arrival.
Whoever is posting those seems to be the one person on the planet sending out useful info about this. The biggest container terminal on the East Coast is closed today and tomorrow.6/27/2017 7:11:15 PM
As of 6:30 Tues. 6/27, APM Terminals employees are still without email or office telephone services. No emails or voicemails can be accessed or answered. Please standby for PA Alerts or for critical matters please contact Giovanni Antonuccio (908) 966 - 2779.
The Maersk site still has nothing but a statement that they are down. Maersk's Twitter feed has nothing useful. No press releases. The only useful comments are coming from non-Maersk port employees.
[1] http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/maersk-line... [2] http://labusinessjournal.com/news/2017/jun/27/maersk-halts-o...
I wouldn't be surprised if nobody had access to the password.
* Los Angeles APM container terminal shut down for today according to press report.[3] No mention of this on APM web site.[4]
* Port Elizabeth (NJ) APM container terminal is down for incoming trucks, according to Port Authority of NY and NJ site.[5] No mention of this on APM web site for the port, so apparently APM web site updates have stopped.
* Mobile (AL) APM container terminal is down.[6]
[1] https://my.maerskline.com/ [2] http://www.apmterminals.com [3] http://www.sgvtribune.com/business/20170627/la-ports-largest... [4] http://www.apmterminals.com/en/operations/north-america/los-... [5] https://www.panynj.gov/port/ [6] http://wkrg.com/2017/06/27/widespread-cyberattack-impacts-co...
if this catches on.
It's not hard. You don't actually have to change much. You just have to schedule regular pentests, ideally every couple weeks.
Pentests protect everyone because it's our job to worry about all of the security flaws that you can't possibly be aware of in your normal day-to-day development cycle. There's just too much for any organization to know about except security companies. This way you can focus on development and we can focus on pointing out how to fix what's broken.
Security is a mindset. Any "checklist" approach will eventually devolve into ass-covering by an organization that is not internally motivated to run a tight ship. Legitimate variances will be hassled to no end, while actual security vulnerabilities will be ignored.
This is a very effective approach at cutting through ass-covering. Company B has to fix the security problems uncovered in the pentest. There is no other option. And I've seen it take products from "SQL injection by typing an apostrophe" to "It'd be very difficult to exploit this app."
If that's not proof that pentsts are effective, then I'm not sure what would be.
We like to say that security is a mindset, but developers have way too much on their mind to be aware of every possible security vector. It's easier and more effective to punt and let us worry about it instead.
No, it is not, you just need skilled people working on it. Oh, those people want money for it ...
It's exactly the same as physical security. You build fences and buy locks. You pay people to keep an eye on things. You take insurance to cover the rest of the risk.
Nothing hard, no new inventions required. It just takes some attention and cash. It's part of the cost of being in business.
It's not impossible but it requires a somewhat universal attitude change.
It's a positive statement though: it is possible to be constantly secure if you just get a pentest every few weeks. Big companies can even afford to make it a requirement of their release cycle.
Oh man. I have a peer who works for a very large international company. They require pentests in their release cycle. What could go wrong?
Turns out that pentesting isn't in the final portion of their release. They tag a release candidate (e.g. v5.7.0-rc), send that build to the pentesters, then fix other integration and user-acceptance bugs while the pentesters are working. The pentesters may greenlight v5.7.0-rc when it's really v5.7.3-rc that's shipping, and the pentesters are none the wiser.
Security only works when the culture supports it.
The impression I have is that today's event was the result of a lot of companies allowing insecure-on-principle architectures like a zillion apps each with their own update structure (random Ukrainian enterprise app supplier gets penetrated and the whole world goes down). A pentester might never be able to find that vector until that app supplier leaves their door open or someone finds out about them for example.
And this also collides with the willingness to do anything to save a couple of dollars and once that dictate isn't flowing through every once of the company's blood, who knows what will happen.
To make secure systems, we need to take the (very) difficult road of working our systems bottom up and proving the absence of vulnerabilities and defining the boundaries of safe operations.
When a new feature is proposed, it's rare to hear someone object on the grounds that it could potentially add new vulnerabilities, but in the long run an approach that recognizes and considers those risks would be beneficial.
At the same time, this is incredibly hard to do - managers celebrate employees who develop things that look cool and awesome, not employees who can mitigate risk and manage security effectively (hopefully this changes, but I can't imagine that many unaffected CEOs are calling up their sysadmins right now and congratulating them on their diligence in making sure all their machines are patched).
Externals and people with a MacBook could continue working.
Some departments request personal to stay home tomorrow.
Mail seems to also be down, although I don't understand as it is hosted on outlook.com
I mean all of IT can access the box once I give them the password for the vault I gave them. That's just the right thing to do. But no one touches or updates my fortress of last hope but me, from a local shell.
They made themselves fragile to this attack. It was completely gratuitous.
They are large enough to chart their own destiny and critical enough to care deeply about it ... and they built on top of cutesy new versions of Windows that everyone knows are garbage.
How does that old saying go ?
"Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me a multitude of times, in varying circumstances, over and over and over again for two fucking decades, shame on me."
Something like that ...
small spoiler ahead
This Daemon is an AI that keeps data of big companies hostage - it will destroy all that company's data if the company does not pay protection money, or if the company involves law enforcement.
Because a lot of companies in the novel don't stick to the AI's rules, these companies go down with the exact same symptoms as Maersk is now having:
- unable to do business
- unclear what happened
- declining stock prices
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daemon_(novel_series)
[1] http://www.maersk.com/en