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Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by enimodas on Friday June 23, 2017 @12:22PM (#14620323)
Doesn't the device case act as a faraday cage?
Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by JoachimSchipper on Friday June 23, 2017 @12:40PM (#14620498)
Less so than we expected; a metallic case definitely reduces the signal strength, but IIRC for the one case we tried placing, the small-loop antenna directly on the case still gets you a good-enough signal to break this (pretty basic) AES implementation. Someone could definitely do more research into that, though - we only did a one-off experiment.

Of course, everyone uses plastic nowadays... ;-)

Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by marcosdumay on Friday June 23, 2017 @01:01PM (#14620708)
> but IIRC for the one case we tried placing, the small-loop antenna directly on the case still gets you a good-enough signal

Was the case grounded?

Laptops are mostly plastic and some non-grounded metal. Desktops are mostly grounded steel.

Steel may be permeable enough for a tempest attack. I don't know.

Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by cramsay on Friday June 23, 2017 @01:16PM (#14620856)
Good point. The case wasn't grounded but that is more common for embedded targets/laptops.

We haven't looked at attacking desktops but the fact that there is a market for tempest shielded desktops (from OSPL, etc.) is perhaps an indication that it might still be possible...