Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by JoachimSchipper on Friday June 23, 2017 @09:11AM
(#14618879)
This is research by my close colleagues; I'm happy to answer any questions.
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Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by calculat0r on Friday June 23, 2017 @10:46AM
(#14619539)
What mode of operation of AES was used for the analysis?
Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by JoachimSchipper on Friday June 23, 2017 @10:52AM
(#14619580)
ECB, I think? The focus was definitely on attacking the crypto core per se.
(Of course, ECB is almost certainly a bad idea if you're trying to build an actual application!)
Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by cramsay on Friday June 23, 2017 @01:05PM
(#14620746)
Yes, ECB, although other modes would only require superficial changes. In practice the harder task is actually identifying the mode in use!
Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by enimodas on Friday June 23, 2017 @12:22PM
(#14620323)
Doesn't the device case act as a faraday cage?
Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by JoachimSchipper on Friday June 23, 2017 @12:40PM
(#14620498)
Less so than we expected; a metallic case definitely reduces the signal strength, but IIRC for the one case we tried placing, the small-loop antenna directly on the case still gets you a good-enough signal to break this (pretty basic) AES implementation. Someone could definitely do more research into that, though - we only did a one-off experiment.
Of course, everyone uses plastic nowadays... ;-)
Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by marcosdumay on Friday June 23, 2017 @01:01PM
(#14620708)
> but IIRC for the one case we tried placing, the small-loop antenna directly on the case still gets you a good-enough signal
Was the case grounded?
Laptops are mostly plastic and some non-grounded metal. Desktops are mostly grounded steel.
Steel may be permeable enough for a tempest attack. I don't know.
Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ...
by cramsay on Friday June 23, 2017 @01:16PM
(#14620856)
Good point. The case wasn't grounded but that is more common for embedded targets/laptops.
We haven't looked at attacking desktops but the fact that there is a market for tempest shielded desktops (from OSPL, etc.) is perhaps an indication that it might still be possible...