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A comment on Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal equipment [pdf]. Parent comment

Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by dom0 on Friday June 23, 2017 @06:16AM (#14618108)
No, not at all. A raised SNR can be overcome in almost all circumstances by making more measurements, i.e. correlation, since noise is not correlated, it is removed. For the same reason random delays don't help against timing attacks.
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Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by Drdrdrq on Friday June 23, 2017 @02:26PM (#14621454)
Curious: how about generating noise which is correlated to signal and actively tries to modify output to some "random" noise?
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Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by Cyph0n on Friday June 23, 2017 @01:25PM (#14620939)
That's how DPA works as far as I understand.
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Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by Ferofluid on Friday June 23, 2017 @07:36AM (#14618413)
Not if you calculate keys nonstop, then have another machine pick from a huge list later.
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Re:Tempest attacks against AES: Stealing keys using minimal ... by tinus_hn on Friday June 23, 2017 @07:13AM (#14618316)
Perhaps you could quantize the level.
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