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Re:Facebook’s Safety Check is a stress-inducing flip of soci... by seanp2k2 on Thursday June 15, 2017 @01:19AM (#14558075)
The tools are there for you to try it:

https://www.charlesproxy.com/documentation/faqs/using-charle...

http://docs.telerik.com/fiddler/Configure-Fiddler/Tasks/Conf...

You could probably also do it with the emulator. You may need to do something like https://www.bettercap.org/blog/sslstripping-and-hsts-bypass/ or it could be even harder: http://docs.mitmproxy.org/en/stable/certinstall.html#certifi...

There are of course ways around this: https://serializethoughts.com/2016/08/18/bypassing-ssl-pinni...

If you need some more hints: https://github.com/ac-pm/SSLUnpinning_Xposed

https://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=3034811

https://eaton-works.com/2016/07/31/reverse-engineering-and-r...

If you do this, please write it up. I'm sure that many people would be interested in this research if it hasn't already been done.

EDIT: In the spirit of POC||GTFO, I got curious and did it myself. I don't see any evidence of any mic uploads. The worst thing I see is it posting your current location. Here's a screenshot of the typical stuff I was seeing (this particular one is for the messenger portion of the app, and it looks like it's pulling in assets for stickers. I have the Pusheen pack because it's hella adorbs): https://i.imgur.com/dVekldx.png

It's POSTing to graph.facebook.com as you scroll to get more data. It's just JSON and pretty easy to figure out what's going on. I just followed http://docs.telerik.com/fiddler/Configure-Fiddler/Tasks/Conf... . I guess they're not pinning their certs, at least on my Nexus 7 and the version of the FB app that I used (v26.0.0.22.16 on Android 5.1.1 on the 2012 Nexus 7, since that's what I had laying around to mess with easily).

This literally took about 5 minutes to set up and get working. I encourage those curious to try it and see for themselves. I just read http://www.portero.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-gucci-infogra... aloud (I never shop for Gucci handbags, so seeing ads for them would be the tell) to test. I'm not some forensics expert but again, looks like nothing I wouldn't expect, definitely not uploading audio streams to Facebook as I'm speaking or +/- 5 minutes. Again though, check it out for yourself.

EDIT 2: I searched for a few unique strings from some of the decoded JSON my N7 was sending to FB and found https://github.com/macliu010/android_facebook_decomplied , which should be interesting for those following along at home.

Re:Facebook’s Safety Check is a stress-inducing flip of soci... by pdkl95 on Thursday June 15, 2017 @05:54AM (#14559039)
While I applaud any attempt to gather real and first-person observations...

> I don't see any evidence of any mic uploads.

... I am somewhat concerned at what seems to be a common assumption that Facebook (or any other remote server) is sending the same software to everybody. I find that unlikely when "AB testing" and similar practices are are commonly used. Facebook is very strongly involved with "targeted" services which suggests they are more likely than most to send different versions to different audiences. Obviously that isn't proof, but it's a good reason to extrapolating from a single example.

Version numbers and hashes of the installer or binaries from all parties would help a lot.

> I encourage those curious to try it and see for themselves

That's always good advice.

Re:Facebook’s Safety Check is a stress-inducing flip of soci... by goldfire on Thursday June 15, 2017 @12:01PM (#14561594)
If we're talking about mobile apps, it seems more likely that they would send the same software to everyone and just turn on these features being tested by sending some activation signal from a central coordinating service, or perhaps including it in some web content that the app might use. That seems much easier than actually distributing different apps.
Re:Facebook’s Safety Check is a stress-inducing flip of soci... by pdkl95 on Thursday June 15, 2017 @02:01PM (#14562750)
> more likely

My point is that guessing without actual data isn't evidence. It's easy to speculate and guess at what we think is going on, but it's a bad idea to assume any particular speculation is right in the best situations. It's foolish when the subject of the investigation's core business model is based on sending different things to specifically targeted groups.

> just turn on these features

Perhaps. There are many ways a feature like this could be implemented. See the various obfuscated code contests for extreme examples of how functionality can be hidden in a program. This just means network logs from different clients are also needed, in addition to hashes of binaries.

Re:Facebook’s Safety Check is a stress-inducing flip of soci... by aedron on Thursday June 15, 2017 @06:16AM (#14559113)
How would you know if it is tunneling out the data, concealed as any other kind of traffic, and at some future point after recording?

I am pretty sure it would be undetectable if done right, given no access to the source code of the multiple Facebook components running on your device (some pre-installed by the manufacturer and unremoveable).

Re:Facebook’s Safety Check is a stress-inducing flip of soci... by dcsommer on Thursday June 15, 2017 @02:55AM (#14558432)
This would make an interesting blog post.
Re:Facebook’s Safety Check is a stress-inducing flip of soci... by seanp2k2 on Thursday June 15, 2017 @03:27AM (#14558530)
Thanks. I don't keep a blog anymore or I'd do it. They have also recently denied doing this: http://www.businessinsider.com/is-facebooks-app-spying-on-me... so if anyone can show evidence otherwise, it would likely be A Big Deal.

EDIT: Sounds like they might pin certs on newer versions of the iOS app. https://github.com/Naituw/HackingFacebook might be useful to get around that. I haven't tried it.