The Zumwalt is an unmitigated disaster. Clearly it is not a good fit as a frontline warship. With its guns neutered, its role as a primary anti-submarine-warfare asset in question, its anti-air-warfare capabilities inferior to those of our current workhorse, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and its stealth not nearly as advantageous as advertised, the Zumwalt seems to be a ship without a mission.
As for airworthiness, it should be noted Lockheed has no, no commercial airframe business. Boeing's commercial business exceeds all military programs in production scale. Observers of the competition generally agreed (1) Boeing could have produced better airframes given a more reasonable timeframe, (2) separate airframes (as Boeing proposed and eventually happened in the F35 anyway) would provide better performance per dollar.
As for the Zumwalt, I'll just leave Robert Work's paper (2) as an exercise for the reader.
The Ford is too big to say much of anything about "the Ford". Carriers are huge investments. On investment scale, it's equivalent to building a city from scratch. If you haven't been on one, you probably can't wrap your head around the scale of the thing. Nuclear reactors, an airport, 5-6000 people, enough munitions to level a small city. And it's own flotilla of warships.
(1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Strike_Fighter_program
(2) http://awin.aviationweek.com/Portals/AWeek/Ares/work%20white...
Even down to the serious opioid problem we are having.
Qing's warships are just good on paper, but the men in charge of them lack actual real-world experiences wielding them effectively.
While F35 Zumwalt Ford are all products driven by US military's real-world experiences, guided by their requirements, and addresses real issues. And I have no doubt that these weapons can be used effectively in their designated use cases.
Their failure is that the engineering work did not finish quick enough to land their impact in appropriate time frame.