For NSA documents classified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printing, they watermark the text. How do they do this?

For NSA documents classified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printed they watermark the text. How?

They can also sprinkle typos:

For NSA documents clasified "top secret" they don't just watermark when printing, they watermark the text. How do they do this?

Another option: They'll include meaningless "extra" information after the text such as a glossary or word definitions or even just something that looks like background info copied from Wikipedia.

Of course, it all depends on how the document was obtained. The systems that modify texts in this way aren't used everywhere.

Yes it certainly is. The Intercept should have taken such precautions, but it's not very smart to assume that they always will take those precautions. If you want to be safe as the leaker, you'll have to either do that sort of thing yourself or communicate with The Intercept to make sure they will. Point is that you cannot really control how much caution third parties will take with your documents.

But like I said, the government has every incentive to make us question The Intercept's competence in these matters even though there are many ways the government could have found the leakers. Leakers _should_ be worried about these sorts of things, but we as the general populace should realize that this is perfect opportunity to make The Intercept look bad and to deter future leaks.

Blaming the leaker is failing the argument.

I'm not really sure what argument is failing. I'm certainly blaming the leaker for using bad opsec (sent emails to The Intercept using a work computer). I'm also certainly blaming The Intercept for using bad opsec. I'm also pointing out that the government has every incentive to act like it was The Intercept's bad opsec that allowed them to find the leaker even if they, for example, found who it was by just looking at access logs for the document.

> There's no evidence that it was The Intercept's actions that caused her to be found.

There's plenty of evidence The Intercept's actions caused her to be found. It's documented in the FBI's affidavits for arrest and search warrants. https://www.buzzfeed.com/stevenperlberg/a-federal-government...

To wit: 'The Reporter told the Contractor that the Reporter had received the documents through the mail, and they were postmarked "Augusta, Georgia."'

So the FBI looked up who printed the document and of those six, who lived in Augusta, GA. Open and shut. Thanks, The Intercept!

Yes, but there were only six who printed it to begin with. I'm inclined to agree that the Intercept shouldn't have shared that information with the contractor, but it's not at all clear that the leaker wouldn't have been found anyway.

How does the FBI know it was printed? Because the Intercept told them. It could have been screenshots from a phone. It could have been downloaded from some hack. The number of people that viewed a document is going to be a superset of the number of people that viewed and printed a document. And if they're worried someone could access the report outside of their controls, then the set gets even larger. The Intercept only needed to disclose some content and the intelligence report number to get confirmation. Instead, they gave away how they got the report (printed), narrowing it to a set of six, and then they gave away the postmark, narrowing to a set of one. The Intercept burned their source.

>How does the FBI know it was printed? Because the Intercept told them.

The images have clear fold lines in them.

There's not much evidence that The Intercept tried very hard to protect her identity, either.

Plenty of evidence: https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/06/how-a-few-yellow-do...

Massive incompetence and amateurish stuff on part of the leaker and The Intercept. Yellow dots have been known for ages.

That article contains the following "evidence" claiming this is how the leaker was unmasked:

> Armed with this evidence, the NSA was able to quickly determine who had printed the document by checking audit logs.

So no I see exactly _zero_ evidence in that article that this was the method used. If you have any other article that has such evidence, I'm all ears.

Of course you're correct that The Intercept should have taken more care in this matter, but that doesn't mean that this was the reason why the leaker was found. The leaker should also have been a bit less amateur (e.g. not communicating with The Intercept on a _work_ computer).

Do you think the NSA wouldn't have checked access logs and the emails if not for the scan? The difference isn't between getting caught vs. not, it's between getting caught in days vs weeks.

But also caught with irrefutable proof. The printer and job time can be tracked back to her precisely. With that in hand, there is absolutely no doubt that leak came from her (she intentionally shared), or through her (she printed, but someone else shared, with or without her knowledge).