Still I don't see how the Intercept could have handled this better. Maybe they should have been looking for printer dots in documents received in the mail and then block it out when they digitize it. But is this really a common practice among news orgs handling leaked docs?
I see people on Reddit attacking The Intercept because, they say, the printer dot thing is 'common knowledge'. But to me this seems like an easy thing to overlook. Especially if most other leaks were digital. News organizations and leakers will certainly all be looking for this going forward (I hope).
As far as I'm concerned all the 'common knowledge' stuff that was overlooked was all via the leaker.
The intercept could have handled this better by describing the article and maybe a citation or two, to pass the originals back in some form to the government is about as stupid as it gets.
If anything this article shows how easy it is to play 33 bits if you have help from the subject or some outsider that is just doing their job in a ham fisted way.
There's a hell of a lot of capability which comes about through opportunity, chance, and simple dumb luck or repeated attempts to do something. This tends to show up frequently in terror and mass-criminal activities. Simply wanting to accomplish some negative effect, and having general means to do so, is frequently enough, particularly if that threat is underappreciated and/or requires a high degree of vigelance.
There are numerous attacks (water, food, infrastructure) which have been highlighted for decades as potential attack vectors, though they appear not to have been undertaken.
Another possiblity, of course, is that there is constant low-level probing of such attacks, which are lost either at the internal or public-discourse level as noise or accidents. There remain cases -- the San Jose electrical power substation attack via small-arms fire, US military seeding of infectious agents over urban populations[1], the CIA's attacks on Soviet gas infrastructure via control equipment[2] and Iranian nuclear material refining via stuxnet[3]. In which case, much of the expressed concern of US intelligence agencies is an awareness of their own capabilities, and practices. Other foreign powers have their own history here -- Russian tea[4], Israeli hotel service[5], and Chinese messenger service[6] come to mind.
Criticisms of The Intercept are validated, IMO, by the Intercept's own positioning of itself as a safe channel for such leaks,[7] and specific in-house expertise on the matter, Micah Lee.[8]
Even if The Intercept's actions didn't directly contribute to identification or confirmation of Ms. Winner as the source of these documents, the fact that they could have is absolutely material, and represents a massive failure on the part of Intercept staff and procedures.
Other points to consider: people's technological savviness is on general exceedingly poor, and even domain experts are generally only experts within that specific domain. At the level of the general population, only 5-8% of users have "advanced" skills -- which means ability to use such features as "sort" or "find and replace" within a word-processing tool.[9]
This means that an organisation such as The Intercept should focus as a principle priority on protecting its sources against themselves.
Ms. Winner's OpSec was poor on multiple counts. The Intercept amplified those weaknesses.
Finally: Information isn't power, but is a force-multiplier. It may amplify either your strength's or your opponents'. In this case, the question (from the NSA's perspective) was to identify just who it was that might have provided the information in question. Any one individual can be uniquely identified by 33 bits of information. In the NSA's case, most of those bits are already defined by a simple basis of access to information. The documents here had only to discriminate amongst the much smaller set of people -- call it 3-6 bits -- who might have supplied them to The Intercept.
Other lessons are that in previous totalitarian societies, registration of typing and duplicating equipment was routinely used to identify a potential source of documents. Because those determinations were based on fixed characteristics, that was all they could divulge. Today's printers define not only the specific machine, but time, and potentially metadata of the document itself or submitting user.
You might want to reflect on that for a bit.
________________________________
Notes:
1. http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/bodyhorrors/2015/06/28/san...
2. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1...
3. https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/
4. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/1138178...
5. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/tourists-with-a-li...
6. http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/06/01/gmail-compromised-chi...
7. https://theintercept.com/leak/
The Intercept did not encourage her to steal this information, nor did it give her any direction on how to do so. She chose her own method of exfiltrating the data, and in this case it turned out to be an quickly identifiable one. She knew this document was going to be published by the Intercept; that was the entire point of leaking it. Once published, regardless of form, you can bet that the FBI would have agents knocking on the Intercept's door asking to see the physical source material.
Furthermore, In order to prove the veracity of its published claims, the Intercept provides its source documents - if they do not, they simply open themselves up to accusations of fake news and falsified material. Any editing they do to the document will be ammunition for the FAKE NEWS crowd - so where is the compromise here?
Greenwald is not located in the United States for a reason (so good luck knocking on that door), and if they wanted to verify the documents they could have done so with a bit more care.
Assuming the text did not contain steganographic tricks (yes, that works) they could have cited back a few paragraphs and the document title. That would have been enough.
> Greenwald is not located in the United States for a reason (so good luck knocking on that door),
Greenwald has said he moved to Brazil because he wanted to be with his partner and that was the solution that they chose; at the time, one couldn't sponsor an immigrant visa for a same-sex partner in the United States.
This document wasn't reported by Glenn Greenwald, but rather by Matthew Cole, Richard Esposito, Sam Biddle, Ryan Grim, who all appear to live in the United States. Almost all of the Intercept's reporters who report on and publish leaked classified materials live and work in the U.S.
While you have some good points, I think hanging your argument on a 'would' is not really convincing :)
I am trying to come up with a suitable analogy to illustrate how stupid this is. I imagine a WWII intercept of an Enigma message being decoded and the clerk in charge then calling up the German High Command to verify the accuracy of the decoder. It is totally baffling to me that they did this in the way described without for one second thinking about how vulnerable their source was.
Corporate emails sometimes use this trick to catch company leakers.
What matters is that if she had not made any mistakes the intercept made it trivially easy to reduce the pool of possible suspects. That´s fairly stupid if your whole reason for existence is to handle documents sent to you by vulnerable people.
If this is not the last article by the Intercept based on stuff leaked to them it would highly surprise me.
They totally messed this up.