And yeah, it does effect other lender-borrower relationships. It's all people, and people get nervous.
Brazil is once again facing mounting debt due continuous budget deficit. This time the govt is pushing for austerity reforms that, if not approved, will lead once again to default. The govt approved ratings are abismal and populist candidates are expected to win next year's general election.
So, defaulting sucks.
Not defaulting worked extremely poorly for Greece.
It all depends on the particular circumstances of a country. If you're going to be building massive amounts of infrastructure, then yeah, you may want to consider not defaulting. On the other hand, if the foundations of your economy are sound, you may do well to default, and live with the credit rating hit.
You get a Greece like deflationary spiral that basically totally destroys your economy, and any hope you ever had of paying off the debt.
Bring on the defaults.
They're shut off from [cheap] public markets though. So while your statement is technically correct, they are usually stuck with lenders of last resort, such as IMF or direct country-to-country loans, which generally come with pretty harsh terms.
That's the lenders' fault. Bleed the suckers dry. Lenders like that shouldn't get to manage money.
If after the default, they are in a reasonable state, then yeah, people will lend them money, because there is a good chance they will make a big enough profit.
You WANT to be a lender which balances the risk with the rewards. You don't want one which just blanketly says no to something which has a low risk, which will make a lot of money because you are arse hurt about it.
Yep, for example this is why no American bank will give loans to Donald Trump anymore. Too many bankruptcies. So he isn't worth the risk.
If you have any spare cash on hand (investor inflows, interest payments and bonds redemptions on other bonds) your choices are:
1) Hold cash, the more the better, in order to prop up the value of the fund.
2) Lend it to another borrower.
I'd say that if you expect a smooth sailing or are in a situation where investors cannot liquidate, strategy (2) is reasonable. But even then you might want to extract some better terms from the borrower by quoting PR as a scare factor.
Most funds, however, will expect either investor outflows or markdowns in other municipal bonds with similar characteristics. For better or for worse, the municipal market is frozen for a new borrower, at least for the next few days.
If the Puerto Rico government defaults now, no banks should lend money to it again ever. Perfect.
This outcome doesn't affect other lender-borrower relationships.