This is an archetypally typical Thomas opinion, melding both a very literal and narrow reading of the Constitution and laws with a strong preference towards states' rights.
Meanwhile, Alito's concurring (with the majority) opinion is a fascinating read in its own right, building on similar rationales to those of Thomas while using a comparative, devil's advocate approach to illustrate absurdities in both the laws and the interpretation of the majority, yet reaching a pragmatic conclusion that happens to concur with the majority in its final judgment.
Think about it this way, it's like malpractice insurance for doctors. So there should be malpractice insurance for states/courts - if a conviction is later overturned and the state is liable for the return of property, it gets paid out by insurance.
> This highlights a potential chilling effect of this ruling. As states are now on the perpetual hook for any monies that may be confiscated from someone who is eventually exonerated (and in the case of white-collar crime, this could be millions of dollars), and since you can't know that someone won't be exonerated in the future, states who are interested in keeping their budgets balanced will be incentivized to hold such money in escrow instead of dispensing it for victim's relief.
It seems that Thomas's dissent finds its basis in that the defendants should have followed the due process set forth in the Exoneration Act to have a substantive entitlement to the money, on the other hand in Alito's concurring opinion he quite explicitly disagrees and posits that the Exoneration Act violates due process:
These stringent requirements all but guarantee that most defendants whose convictions are reversed have no realis - tic opportunity to prove they are deserving of refunds. Colorado has abandoned historical procedures that were more generous to successful appellants and incorporated a court’s case-specific equitable judgment. Instead, Colorado has adopted a system that is harsh, inflexible, and pre- vents most defendants whose convictions are reversed from demonstrating entitlement to a refund. Indeed, the Colorado General Assembly made financial projections based on the assumption that only one person every five years would qualify for a financial award under the Exon- eration Act. Colorado Legislative Council Staff Fiscal Note, State and Local Revised Fiscal Impact, HB 13–1230, p. 2 (Apr. 22, 2013), online at http://leg.colorado.gov (as last visited Apr. 17, 2017). Accordingly, the Exoneration Act does not satisfy due process requirements. See Cooper v. Oklahoma , 517 U. S. 348, 356 (1996) (A state rule of criminal procedure may violate due process where “a rule significantly more favorable to the defendant has had a long and consistent application”).
IANAL
Reading the dissent, it basically says: when the person was convicted, they paid their fine, and at that point the fine money is now property of the state. The overturning of the original conviction doesn't, however, mean that the fine money also reverts ownership - he claims it is still in ownership by the state so the person cannot claim it is their property being deprived without due process under the 14th amendment.
He proposes that the "correct" way to get the money back is by invoking this other thing called "The Exoneration Act," NOT the 14th. The problem is the Exoneration Act isn't a law that says the state HAS to return funds, it's more of a specific appeal process for people to apply to get funds back. In other words, he recognizes there is no state law in Colorado that requires refunding these fees (nor does he offer a viable Federal one), but he claims there is a process available, at least.
In that sense, his dissent isn't really about him believing these people are NOT owed a refund in the moral sense of what is just, he's simply arguing that the court should not establish that refunds of costs/fines in cases where convictions are overturned is guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. It's kind of a pedantic dissent. And I still don't agree with him :)
The intent behind Thomas's particular brands of "fatuous pedantry" (more commonly called textualism or originalism) are preserving a maximum amount of power to the people through their representative governments.
If the people of Colorado did not see fit to provide such recourse to their exonerated ex-convicts, Thomas believes that the Constitution does not require them to do so. The Constitution merely requires equal protection under the law, and there is no law that is being applied unequally in this case; everyone is equally entitled to seek relief under the Colorado statute, which presumably represents the will of Coloradans as expressed through their state government. If Colorodans do not like this, they can enact change through their government.
When the Supreme Court acts and rules a law either valid or invalid, it's an unelected branch of the federal government imposing its will on the people. This is especially sensitive when the will is being imposed on the states. The Constitution was carefully designed to limit the reach of federal power and allow more authority to more local governments. Disputes over the extent of state's rights are no trivial matter -- they've caused our only civil war thus far.
Anyway, I've found that a great deal of judicial activity is based on highly technical issues that many would consider "fatuous pedantry". IMO it is totally reasonable to suggest a basic modernization/overhaul in our legal system. Until then, however, my experience is that "fatuous pedantry" and "law" go together so often they may as well be synonymous.
You're doing a thoroughly good job of playing one on HN. Thank you for a very informative analysis.
As a sibling commenter points out, it's easy to sound credible by throwing words around without really understanding the nuances. It's always nerve-wracking when someone may take you a little too seriously. I've learned I need to put two disclaimers on my "playing lawyer" posts because just one wasn't enough to avoid the ire of some people who I assume are real lawyers. ;)
And to be honest, if I were a real lawyer, I would still probably want to "IANAL" disclaim most of these speculative/navel-gazing posts anyway.
For that, I've seen the disclaimer "I am a lawyer, but I am not your lawyer."
:)
IANAL either but wouldn't the victim's relief come from a civil trial, not a criminal one?
I believe there are already processes in place that can be undertaken to delay payment on appeal. Why should criminal penalties be awarded, subject to immediate payment and then have to go through another court proceeding where the plaintiff has to prove their innocence again to get it back?
Many jurisdictions have victim compensation as part of criminal process, which makes some sense as an economy of justice measure, since the burden of proof against the defendant is higher in criminal trial than it would be at a civil trial (so, in principle, the defendant isn't losing any protection) and it prevents the victim from having to go through the whole process of civil litigation.
>The Court today announces that petitioners have a right to an automatic refund because the State has “no legal right” to that money. Ante, at 8, n. 11. But, intuitive and rhetorical appeal aside, it does not seriously attempt to ground that conclusion in state or federal law.
In the rest of the dissent, Thomas discusses the due process that was available under Colorado's Exoneration Act and indicated that this law did not automatically entitle convicted persons to an automatic refund of any fees associated with their convictions, partially because state law ordered that money to be dispensed via victim compensation funds.
This highlights a potential chilling effect of this ruling. As states are now on the perpetual hook for any monies that may be confiscated from someone who is eventually exonerated (and in the case of white-collar crime, this could be millions of dollars), and since you can't know that someone won't be exonerated in the future, states who are interested in keeping their budgets balanced will be incentivized to hold such money in escrow instead of dispensing it for victim's relief.
If the exonerated individual could demonstrate his legal entitlement to those monies, he was free to bring a suit under the applicable statutes to do so.
Because the law applied equally and anyone could seek relief, Thomas appears to believe it does not violate the 14th Amendment.
If the people of Colorado did not think this was fair, it was within the purview of their representative government to change. The role of SCOTUS is not to make sure the world is fair; it is to review statutes for compliance against the Constitution and other relevant federal law.
In short, it seems an accurate summary would be that, in Thomas's opinion, the Court's opinion was "activist judgeship", as they merely thought it "intuitively and rhetorically [appealing]" that a state would not be entitled to the funds already paid by an exonerated person and already dispensed by the state, but could point to no law codifying this "intuitive and rhetorical appeal".
Again, IANAL.