If you're going to insist that everybody gets everything security-related exactly right the first time, well, you may be morally in the right but you're signing up for a lot of disappointment.
The latter are worse in my opinion, because they're harder to fix.
I'm sure this attitude is behind the 90% useless "security reports" that they receive.
That said, an issue like the one reported is inarguably on the wrong side of that boundary, both conceptually (not requiring host key verification by default) or empirically (by the data collected by the reporter).
Thanks, though, for your unnecessary, gratuitous, and frankly absurd editorialization.
API design is critically important to security whether or not you believe it to be — we've learned this the hard way through decades of treating keys and IVs as "stringly typed", as overwhelming numbers of developers use `rand` to generate keys and use hardcoded IVs. An API design that encourages misuse will be misused, and the onus to improve the default situation should be on the author of such APIs.
Sounds pretty sharp to me.
Also changing a API of a stdlib is probably not a cool way. I like Java that they don't change things so fast, however in Java they rate of change is too slow, after deprecating something it should be removed some day (java never did), however in go/rust the rate of change is way too much. (and I really like rust) well both have a different release procedure than java, but still when I develop something I really hope that my API keeps the same at least 3 years or more.
I disagree with the author here. A poorly-designed API that encourages rampant insecure misuse is a security vulnerability.
Documentation is not an excuse here.