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Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kutkloon7 on Friday April 21, 2017 @04:53AM (#14163996)
For people claiming that this is a compiler bug, it really is not.

I am no expert, but what I understood is that the C standard defines some situations (such as an overflow error) which result in "undefined behaviour". In this situation, the compiler is free to do whatever he wants. This is in fact what happens here.

This is clearly annoying to programmers. In this case, it is even hard to avoid undefined behaviour even if the source of undefined behaviour (a pointer overflow) is known.

Why is this done? This way the compiler can do some aggresive optimizations which are only valid if there is no undefined behaviour (e.g. no overflow, null pointer acces...).

There are various good articles about this.

To make the situation more complex for programmers, it is possible to write programs which exhibit undefined behaviour but work fine in practice. Until the compiler tries to do a specific optimization.

This is basically why you shouldn't use C. Long-time C programmers know a list of operations which are undefined behaviour, and are usually able to point out a few of these in a program written by newbie (ironically, these programs may run and pass tests just fine).

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by frederikvs on Friday April 21, 2017 @05:11AM (#14164063)
To be specific, only certain types of overflow are undefined behaviour. Signed integers and pointers have undefined behaviour on overflow. Unsigned integers on the other hand are defined to wrap around to 0.

For those interested, good places to start learning more about this are John Regehr's blog [0], or the llvm blog [1].

[0] http://blog.regehr.org/archives/213

[1] http://blog.llvm.org/2011/05/what-every-c-programmer-should-...

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by cperciva on Friday April 21, 2017 @05:13AM (#14164079)
Technically unsigned integer wrapping isn't considered to be "overflow".
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by cperciva on Friday April 21, 2017 @02:27PM (#14168019)
Replying to myself because it's too late to edit the comment: I'm not sure why people are voting that down. Section 6.2.5 paragraph 9 of the C99 standard states that:

A computation involving unsigned operands can never overflow, because a result that cannot be represented by the resulting unsigned integer type is reduced modulo the number that is one greater than the largest value that can be represented by the resulting type.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by GTP on Friday April 21, 2017 @05:47AM (#14164202)
I'm no expert too, but please read this opinion about the problem [0]. I think he has a good point saying that undefined behavior != the compiler has the right to do wathewer it wants. [0] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.os.plan9.general/76989
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by geocar on Friday April 21, 2017 @07:33AM (#14164597)
I think it's a major problem with our industry that so many programmers are amused by being technically correct.

Tradition notwithstanding, if a compiler deletes all my files because of the position of a comma in nested brackets, then I'm going to simply not use that compiler. I don't give a fuck if it's technically correct.

"Oh it's not a bug". Good for you. I don't care if you want to call it a feature or a bug. It's wrong. Press the issue and I'll find someone smarter.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by jjnoakes on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:10AM (#14164763)
I don't know why you think this has anything to do with lack of intelligence.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kutkloon7 on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:39AM (#14164970)
It's true that I like to be technically correct. I don't consider this a problem itself. In fact, it can be quite important for programmers and mathematicians to be technically correct, as this bug in Cap'n Proto illustrates quite nicely.

However, this is not the only reason I'm pointing out that this is not a compiler bug. The other reason is that there are certain implications:

1. The compiler developers are likely to declare that this is not their problem.

2. The problem may exist for other compilers as well: even if it complies to the standard it may do this. Even worse, it may only show up in a new version of the compiler, or in specific situations.

I am not saying that this is a good situation and programmers should just be more careful. Everybody makes mistakes.

The root of the problem is at the specification. Ideally, there would be no undefined behavior. From an optimizer's point of view it is very sensible to assume that the programmer will not invoke undefined behavior and use optimizations based on this principle. People surely love a compiler which produces fast code, so it may not be desirable to totally eradicate undefined behavior (and end this kind of optimizations).

The most practical remedy I see is to add a debug flag which crashes or somehow indicates undefined behavior. Indeed, GCC has done this. So ultimately, we seem to agree that the compilers should change to improve this situation.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by mannykannot on Friday April 21, 2017 @09:08AM (#14165188)
Agreed - I do not think the issue is with being technically correct, but in thinking that it always settles the matter and ends the discussion.

It would seem particularly unfortunate if a compiler were to do static analysis for undefined behavior, but only use it in optimization. From a cursory search, I found this blog post [1] explaining why LLVM does not warn about such things (at least in 2011, when it was written - attitudes may have changed, and the Clang project now has the UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer [2]). One of the arguments is that it is difficult to explain what the problem is, but in my view, that is an argument for making doing so a priority.

[1] http://blog.llvm.org/2011/05/what-every-c-programmer-should-... [2] http://releases.llvm.org/3.8.0/tools/clang/docs/UndefinedBeh...

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kutkloon7 on Friday April 21, 2017 @09:25AM (#14165326)
IMHO, more work should be done on proving properties of programs. If one could make a programming language like Dafny [1] less quirky but more developer-friendly, you can have programs which are both good-performing and proven to be consistent with their specification (but again, quirks in the specification may cause troubles).
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by mannykannot on Friday April 21, 2017 @10:58AM (#14166143)
Thanks for bringing Dafny to my attention. I agree with your first sentence, which is why I think it is a big deal that it can be a great deal harder, in practice, to reason about the behavior of a C program, if optimized, than the same program un-optimized. For one thing, unless you successfully reason about what the optimized code does when deploying an optimized build, then you are not deploying the program that you analyzed or inspected.

I think there is a sort of analogy with a large black hole here [1]: you can slip across the "event horizon" into undefined behavior without noticing, but, especially if you are using an optimizing compiler, there may be no escape.

[1] Maybe not, if the black-hole firewall hypothesis is correct.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by bluejekyll on Friday April 21, 2017 @11:18AM (#14166308)
I'm totally unfamiliar with Dafny, the front page didn't do much more than specicify the goals.

Any chance you could briefly compare it to Rust or another systems level language trying to remove undefined behavior?

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by nickpsecurity on Friday April 21, 2017 @11:23AM (#14166352)
It's more like SPARK Ada. It's a limited language designed for easy analysis by an automated prover. You can do preconditions, postconditions, and invariants in it. It was used in ExpressOS for mobile and I think IronClad Apps, too.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by bluejekyll on Friday April 21, 2017 @11:27AM (#14166391)
Are those pre and post conditions always executed? Or are they optional assertions that can be enabled/disabled?
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by neilparikh on Friday April 21, 2017 @11:44AM (#14166555)
If I'm reading the description correctly, the pre and post conditions are analyzed statically during compiling, and not added to the output code. So it's a similar idea to type checking, where the program won't even compile until the versifier is sure your code meets the conditions.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by GTP on Friday April 21, 2017 @12:49PM (#14167193)
Thanks! I didn't knew about this GCC's feature.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by MaulingMonkey on Friday April 21, 2017 @06:18AM (#14164306)
I'd agree with "undefined behavior != the compiler should do whatever it wants" - but I feel I must admit that the standard lets it, that many compiler authors apparently disagree with me, and that even those who do are sympathetic to my point of view or agree with me may have a point when they say that reason about programmer intention is a difficult bag of worms - and that preserving such, while maintaining "critical" optimizations, may not be as easy as it sounds.

There's always -O0.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by GTP on Friday April 21, 2017 @01:14PM (#14167400)
Of course if the compiler has a certain behavior I have to deal with it, I just feel that certain optimizations based on undefined behavior are too aggressive, later this evening I will maybe write in more detail about this in anoter comment below.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by to3m on Friday April 21, 2017 @09:06PM (#14170585)
My favourite UB-related links:

"These people simply don't understand what C programmers want": https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/boring-crypto/48qa1kWi...

"please don't do this, you're not producing value": http://blog.metaobject.com/2014/04/cc-osmartass.html

"Everyone is fired": http://web.archive.org/web/20160309163927/http://robertoconc... (EDIT: this one just gets better every time I read it...)

I also found a new one thanks to the comments here, which you can find elsewhere in the comments - but I'll add a link to it here anyway, for good measure:

"No sane compiler writer would ever assume it allowed the compiler to 'do anything' with your code": http://article.gmane.org/gmane.os.plan9.general/76989

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Friday April 21, 2017 @10:23PM (#14170805)
OMG, that first link is golden. It starts off by an email from DJB no less, which includes this snippet:

    I should note that this plan, throwing away gcc and clang in favor of a 
    boring C compiler, isn't the only possible response to these types of 
    security holes. Here are several other responses that I've seen: 
    
       * Attack the messenger. "This code that you've written is undefined, 
         so you're not allowed to comment on compiler behavior!" The most 
         recent time I saw this, another language lawyer then jumped in to 
         argue that the code in question _wasn't_ undefined---as if this 
         side discussion had any relevance to the real issue. 
And to top it off, below Kurt Roeckx explains to someone what part of the problem is:

    The undefined behaviour of C is deliberate so that compilers can 
    make optimazations.  They assume you write code that only has 
    defined meaning and generate code for that defined meaning.  That 
    means for instance that if you add 2 signed integers they're going 
    to assume it doesn't overflow and then for instance make 
    assumptions based on that on wether other code ever going to be 
    executed or not. 
Niiice. This exact scenario is what happened and it's given as an example of problematic optimization of undefined behavior by compilers. If I felt it was pointless to really expect any change before, I definitely do now.

I'm definitely favoriting your comment so I can find it easily later.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by mpweiher on Friday April 21, 2017 @06:46AM (#14164408)
There is a difference between "complies with the standard" and "is bug free".

There were C compilers before there was a C standard. They had bugs.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by MaulingMonkey on Friday April 21, 2017 @07:36AM (#14164602)
> There is a difference between "complies with the standard" and "is bug free".

You're not wrong - but the dividing line between bug and feature request is subjective, and just how much (meaningful) difference between the two there is depends on the authors of the compiler.

If you compile with -fno-strict-aliasing and the optimizer breaks your code based solely on strict aliasing violations anyways, by all means, report that as a bug.

If you use a compiler that has no -fno-strict-aliasing equivalent, by all means, switch to a better compiler when they WONTFIX your feature request.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kutkloon7 on Friday April 21, 2017 @07:33AM (#14164598)
undefined behavior = the compiler has the right to do wathever it wants

This is exactly what the C standard says. And yes, that is problematic, especially since there is no way to detect undefined behaviour. I consider this to be the main problem. If C compilers would simply check for undefined behaviour in the debug build, there would be a lot less problems.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by lmm on Friday April 21, 2017 @09:56AM (#14165630)
What the compiler does in the face of undefined behaviour is out of scope for the standard, by definition.

The problem is that the standard was written as a minimum that programmers could rely on even the worst compilers to implement, with the intention that compiler writers would come up with improvements that would then be standardised (the same way that happens with e.g. web standards). Instead compilers regressed to doing the minimum permitted by the standard.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by _pmf_ on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:10AM (#14164762)
> undefined behavior = the compiler has the right to do wathever it wants

It would also be allowed to follow the principle of least surprise. Most instances of UB have a specific expected outcome; for signed overflow, one would probably expect the architecture specific signed overflow handling to happen.

It's a bit paradox that some hard errors for which no such expected outcome exists, such as an address violation, can easily be caught by the programmer (SIGSEGV), but errors (UB) for which a specific, sensible reaction exists are not only silently tolerated, but actively exploited when searching optimization.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by wbl on Friday April 21, 2017 @10:04AM (#14165699)
It's not actively exploited, just ignored when checking the optimization is valid. Putting values in loops into registers can require making assumptions about different types of pointers pointing to different things.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by vertex-four on Friday April 21, 2017 @07:40AM (#14164623)
The issue there is that you pretty much have to use undefined behaviour in C and certain low-level applications of C++. C is therefore a broken language IMHO, but... there we have it.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by _pmf_ on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:15AM (#14164794)
That's wrong. All firmware I worked with used assembly for early initialization (startup.s) in those cases where the only alternative would be to rely on UB. I've worked with firmware that only worked with -O0 and failed with -O2, but these were always bad implementations, not due to some inherent requirement to rely on UB (most common example: failing to recognize that using volatile does not guarantee a memory barrier).
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by vertex-four on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:19AM (#14164823)
> I've worked with firmware that only worked with -O0 and failed with -O2

But as we can see in this vuln, there's functionality that works in the normal case but where important checks are elided, and compilers might decide not to do anything with a piece of undefined behaviour in one version but not in the next. Whether a piece of code works in -O2 doesn't prove it doesn't contain undefined behaviour.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by jjnoakes on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:04AM (#14164731)
I don't think one ever has to rely on undefined behavior.

If you think you do, you can usually rewrite your code to avoid it, or rely on implementation defined behavior for specific compilers.

And if that is not low level enough, you should be using assembly.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by GTP on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:18AM (#14164815)
>This is exactly what the C standard says. No, please read the page that I linked: there are historical reasons to believe that the meaning of undefined behavior is different.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kutkloon7 on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:49AM (#14165054)
I have read it. The rant does explicitly not quote the C standard, and instead informs us of how compilers should work according to the author. Historical context does not change the content of a standard.

From the 2007 draft for the C99 standard[1]: "undefined behavior: behavior, upon use of a nonportable or erroneous program construct or of erroneous data, for which this International Standard imposes no requirements"

[1] http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/wg14/www/docs/n1256.pdf

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by GTP on Friday April 21, 2017 @05:46PM (#14169680)
The International Standard imposes no requirement != The compiler can use flawed logic while making assumptions. By flawed logic I'm reffering to the argument "this situation is undefined so it never happens", in particular applied to the example of pointer dereferencing: when GCC see a pointer being dereferneced it instantly assumes that it isn't null, so if the programmer later explicitly checks for the value being not null GCC ignores it and doesn't translate that part of the program. This can introduce severe vulnerabilities only because the compiler is trying to do an optimization that I find too much aggressive: it decides not to compile an entire part of a program!
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by Asooka on Friday April 21, 2017 @07:19AM (#14164544)
Maybe. I really want to be writing code for a 2-complement integer CPU with 64-bit registers and a unified memory model, where addresses are unsigned integers and address 0 is NULL. I really, really want a portable-assembly flavour of C which would be machine target-dependent and would e.g. throw an error when compiling a pointer comparison for a machine with a nonuniform memory model, if the pointers cannot be proven to be part of the same object. The current model where parts of my code can just get deleted SILENTLY is really hard to reason about. At least add an -Werror-deleted-code (or -Werror-tautology for code that's tautological due to UB), so I can be alerted if that optimisation is done.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by jjnoakes on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:06AM (#14164742)
I think if you had a way to enable warnings about deleted code you would be flooded with warnings from macro expansions, function inlining, template instantiations, and other valid and desirable optimizations.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by caf on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:47AM (#14165033)
I don't think it's that hard to reason about.

Checking for overflow (and pointer-out-of-object-bounds, which is a special case of overflow) in C is like defusing a bomb: you can't cut the red wire and then see if it exploded, you have to check that it won't explode before you cut the wire.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by cperciva on Friday April 21, 2017 @05:13AM (#14164076)
C is unusual in having an explicit concept of undefined behaviour. But that doesn't mean that other languages don't have undefined behaviour... it just means that nobody has gone through the standard (if there even is a standard beyond "the language does what this implementation produces") and identified all of the gaps.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by johncolanduoni on Friday April 21, 2017 @05:22AM (#14164114)
Is it that unusual? I've seen undefined behavior be specifically mentioned in both the Java and CLR standards. Rust's (admittedly squishy) "reference" also specifies a lot of behavior as undefined explicitly (along with a general "if you break mandated invariants behavior is undefined").
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by steveklabnik on Friday April 21, 2017 @09:48AM (#14165548)
In Rust's case, this is limited to unsafe code, at least; safe code should not have UB. (Though, IIRC there is one case right now, but that's a bug) UB is basically "breaking the invariants safe code expects."

Overflow is an example of something that's not UB in Rust, for example. (It's a "program error" and well-defined as two's compliment wrapping.)

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by naasking on Friday April 21, 2017 @09:58AM (#14165658)
> I am no expert, but what I understood is that the C standard defines some situations (such as an overflow error) which result in "undefined behaviour". In this situation, the compiler is free to do whatever he wants.

Except the proper answer to this scenario is to refuse to compile with an appropriate error, not to eliminate your code.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Friday April 21, 2017 @01:42PM (#14167618)
You are asking for the impossible. It is not generally possible for the compiler to detect whether undefined behaviour can occur.

Take a function that returns the square of a signed integer: As long as it's called with arguments that are small enough, the behaviour is perfectly defined. But the compiler cannot necessarily know which values might get passed to it at runtime.

Now, it could in principle add runtime checks that do something defined, like abort the program, when the preconditions for defined behaviour are not met--but that often makes the generated code slow.

That is why the standard says that the compiler can do anything it wants in the case of undefined behaviour: It's just a different way of saying that it's the responsibility of the programmer to make sure that the preconditions for defined behaviour are never violated, so the compiler can generate code based on the assumption that that is the case, instead of littering the code with tons of overhead for the case that the programmer did something wrong.

Compilers don't detect undefined behaviour and then use those detected instances of UB in order to mess up your software, they simply operate on the assumption that there is no UB in your code--which means that the code they generate is correct if there is indeed no UB, but there are no guarantees as to what happens if you don't hold up your implicit promise to not invoke UB.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Friday April 21, 2017 @02:35PM (#14168093)
Any time a compiler has elided some code it's because it has detected that it can because it's undefined, so in the context of this argument saying that the compiler cannot determine undefined behavior is not useful, as we are only talking about the times it already has.

The obvious interpretation of the request to have the compiler error is to have the compiler error in any case it would elide statements. That may be impractical in many or most cases, but it's a different problem than what you are talking about. Presumably there would be some cases where the compiler could warn or abort (if a flag was used) if branches were elided based on undefined behavior and those same branches also included an abort of some type shortly thereafter. Or maybe some better heuristic that I'm not thinking of.

Hard is not the same as impossible, and imperfect is often better than nothing.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Friday April 21, 2017 @06:14PM (#14169852)
> Any time a compiler has elided some code it's because it has detected that it can because it's undefined, so in the context of this argument saying that the compiler cannot determine undefined behavior is not useful, as we are only talking about the times it already has.

No, you have it all backwards, and that's not what's happening. The compiler doesn't elide code because it is undefined. The compiler elides code because it would never be executed unless it happens to be called with arguments that would produce undefined behaviour anyway.

Take this, for example:

    void foo(int *x){
      *x=5;
      if(x==NULL)abort();
    }
The operation that is potentially UB here is the *x=5--if x happens to be NULL. But the compiler doesn't remove that assignment, it removes the check following it. And it does so because execution could never reach that check in a defined manner unless it is false: Either x is NULL, then the behaviour of the assignment is undefined (and commonly would cause a segfault, for example), or it is not NULL, then the check is superfluous.

And there is nothing necessarily wrong with that code: It could be (and such code is common) that it is actually never called with a NULL pointer, in which case the behaviour is perfectly defined.

If a compiler actually determines that your code will always exhibit undefined behaviour, then chances are it will indeed warn you, but that just isn't what usually happens, and it's not the cause of such bugs. The compiler doesn't say "this is undefined, therefore, let's screw it up", it's exactly the opposite: It says "if we assume that this code is never called with arguments that would cause undefined behaviour, what is the most efficient machine code that we could map it to?"

> The obvious interpretation of the request to have the compiler error is to have the compiler error in any case it would elide statements.

That would be plain idiotic. It is perfectly normal to have tons of dead code, erroring out in that case would just make it impossible to compile anything.

You have to consider that the compiler isn't interested in the elegant structure of your code, so it mashes it all up to figure out the most efficient machine code for the whole thing. So, you might have code that calls lots of functions on an array, say, where each function does a bounds check. Now, the compiler potentially will inline it all into one big spaghetti function. And then it will figure out that many of the bounds checks are actually redundant (again, under the assumption that the code doesn't invoke undefined behaviour), so it will remove any checks and corresponding error handling paths that it can prove to be implied by preceding checks, or it might try and combine multiple checks into one.

That does not mean that there is anything wrong with your code, or that you should manually remove all the redundant checks (which might not be redundant for other call sites, after all). The code is perfectly fine, and the compiler tries its best to remove anything that you don't actually need.

> Hard is not the same as impossible, and imperfect is often better than nothing.

True, but also besides the point. Compilers do issue warnings for lots of stuff, and more are added regularly, but much of what you are suggesting is actually not in any way even a coherent idea, and as such, is indeed not just hard, but impossible.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:37PM (#14170508)
> No, you have it all backwards, and that's not what's happening. The compiler doesn't elide code because it is undefined. The compiler elides code because it would never be executed unless it happens to be called with arguments that would produce undefined behaviour anyway.

You're right, it's the interaction between the undefined behavior and the ability to reason about what's possible that's the problem. It's also not entirely pertinent to the overall point, which is that the compiler does know when it elides code, and optimizing out instructions is specifically what this particular issue is about.

> That would be plain idiotic. It is perfectly normal to have tons of dead code, erroring out in that case would just make it impossible to compile anything.

The compiler doesn't need to error on all instances of this, but a flag to have the compiler warn or error if it would remove a unique branch and that branch may exit prior to returning control, that could trigger the desired behavior. If the compiler has enough knowledge to determine redundant code, then it has enough knowledge to know whether it is removing code that is not due to duplication.

C compilers have historically chosen to error on the side of speed, not on the side of safety, and we've built ourselves into a corner. Any new language introduced today that said "well, there's some interesting interactions sometimes if you don't pay close attention, and the compiler/VM might remove statements you write because they are testing those same weird interactions[1] as it things they can't happen" would be laughed out of town.

That the optimizations that C compilers do are complex and have many stages of optimization is not a suitable counter for the criticism that those same optimizations sometimes cause non-obvious interactions with safety checks meant to test the same edge cases that those optimizations take advantage of. That's like someone saying for safety reasons you need to see at least 20 feet of road in front of you at all times per 10 MPH on the highway, and people complaining about how that's not feasible because it would force you to slow down 10-20 MPH occasionally as you went around some turns. Yes. Yes it would. Just because you can do an optimization, doesn't mean you should.

> much of what you are suggesting is actually not in any way even a coherent idea

I'm not the original commenter, but if you're referring to my suggestion of at least warning when entire unique branches of the original code are removed, that's entirely possible. That it might require reworking or ever removing portions of the current optimization pipelines, or cause compilation speed to slow considerably is irrelevant to this particular aspect, because right now we aren't having a discussion of whether it's worth it, but whether it's event possible.

1: As happened here in this case.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Friday April 21, 2017 @10:37PM (#14170854)
> The compiler doesn't need to error on all instances of this, but a flag to have the compiler warn or error if it would remove a unique branch and that branch may exit prior to returning control, that could trigger the desired behavior. If the compiler has enough knowledge to determine redundant code, then it has enough knowledge to know whether it is removing code that is not due to duplication.

I wrote "redundant", not "duplicate", intentionally. A check is redundant if other code implies that it cannot possibly ever end up true. It being a duplicate check is not the only way for that to happen, and it's actually the exception. Also, no, the compiler most likely doesn't have that knowledge. A compiler doesn't work the way you seem to think.

> Any new language introduced today that said "well, there's some interesting interactions sometimes if you don't pay close attention, and the compiler/VM might remove statements you write because they are testing those same weird interactions[1] as it things they can't happen" would be laughed out of town.

Or, more likely, it wouldn't. These are good reasons to not write high-level software in C, but there are also good reasons why people who actually need high speed still do use C. And it's not that we like the fact that writing correct C is hard.

You seem to imply that there is no real reason for C behaving the way it does, and that those rules for undefined behaviour only exist to make the life of programmers miserable. Those things are undefined because making them defined would actually be expensive in terms of performance.

> That the optimizations that C compilers do are complex and have many stages of optimization is not a suitable counter for the criticism that those same optimizations sometimes cause non-obvious interactions with safety checks meant to test the same edge cases that those optimizations take advantage of.

The way you phrase things suggests that you might be confused about how the compiler "reasons". The compiler doesn't read your program, sees what you mean, and then tries to find loopholes in order to misunderstand you. The compiler reads your program, and only understands what your program means according to the formal specification of the language that you claim it is written in. In the example I gave above, you seem to think that there is a call to abort() that the compiler "removes". There isn't. According to the C spec, that call is unreachable, and as such the semantics of that statement is a noop, which is what the compiler will correctly map to machine code, somehow. Explicit dead code removal on some intermediate representation of the AST is just one way that could happen, and it's an implementation detail of the compiler.

> That's like someone saying for safety reasons you need to see at least 20 feet of road in front of you at all times per 10 MPH on the highway, and people complaining about how that's not feasible because it would force you to slow down 10-20 MPH occasionally as you went around some turns. Yes. Yes it would.

Yep, that's a perfect analogy for people complaining that when they talk to a C compiler, they maybe should be writing C, and not a language that they themselves made up, if they expect the compiler to understand them. Even it's sometimes difficult.

> Just because you can do an optimization, doesn't mean you should.

I agree. But for the most part, that's not what's happening. For the most part, optimizations are not intended to break your code, but rather it so happens that, in order to optimize some code, you have to rely on all code having certain correctness properties (that it should have if it is C code, according to the C spec), which then, unfortunately, happens to break some code that doesn't have those properties. Often it's somewhere between infeasible and impossible to distinguish those cases that are correct and can thus be optimized without introducing unwanted behaviour from those that are not correct and thus break as a result.

> I'm not the original commenter, but if you're referring to my suggestion of at least warning when entire unique branches of the original code are removed, that's entirely possible. That it might require reworking or ever removing portions of the current optimization pipelines, or cause compilation speed to slow considerably is irrelevant to this particular aspect, because right now we aren't having a discussion of whether it's worth it, but whether it's event possible.

First, equivalence between pieces of code is undecidable, and second, "unique branches" is not in any way a useful concept anyway.

Sure, you can try to make a compiler detect certain instances of what seems like a safety check that doesn't ever trigger. But that will either be completely ineffective (as it only detects a small minority of cases), or it will produce tons of bogus warnings (because there are tons of cases where it is perfectly sensible to have "unique branches" in your code that are provably never taken, even ones that abort the program, and it is logically impossible to distinguish those from ones that were written with the intent to catch a runtime exception that the programmer expects to actually happen at runtime).

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Friday April 21, 2017 @11:26PM (#14170966)
You seem to be arguing "It's not possible to catch all cases of this". I'm arguing "It's possible to catch some cases of this, and those should be caught and fixed".

In this specific case, the compiler inferred that since two pointers were added, and pointers that overflow is undefined, that it couldn't possibly be that the programmer specified undefined behavior, so it must be that there was no overflow. Since there was "no overflow", the compiler decided that the conditional statement testing for overflow could never be true, and removed that branch.

In the specific example submitted to HN, the compiler has a few options:

First, it can assume the programmer is infallible and will never make a mistake, and use that to actually change the code as defined for performance reasons.

Second, it can assume the programmer is fallible, and that without additional information, it is unsafe to alter the code based on assumptions of programmer infallibility for safety reasons.

Finally, it can assume the programmer is fallible, but try to keep the information present in some manner (tag as "maybe true") so that it can be reported on later, while not using it for additional optimizations for safety with advantages. It would be trivial to note optimization that it could do, but will not because it cannot reason adequately about one or more required assumptions. It would also be trivial to note occurrences of statements where undefined behavior it knows may be encountered if the programmer is not vigilant about the inputs using that same data (that is, it need not report everything, just what it can definitively find). That is, it's trivial because the hard work of detecting the problem cases is already being done.

Currently many C compilers default to optimizing for performance, the first options above. They could, and many think should at a minimum default to safety instead. We know people aren't infallible, so acting like they are has no basis in reality.

That's not to say every optimization has to be thrown out. There should be a distinction between something that can be assumed because of mathematical properties and constraints the compiler enforces compared to constraints it's assumed the programmer will correctly follow. There are clearly cases where the compiler can optimize based on knowledge it it has. If you cast an unsigned char to an int, and add another unsigned char to it prior to doing any other operation, you can assume there will be no overflow. You can assume the same of short on platforms where int is twice as bit as a short.

The bottom line is that compilers are assuming truthfulness of expressions that aren't necessarily true, and that require extraordinary effort from programmers to make sure they avoid, as evidenced by their continual discovery in enterprise grade libraries and applications.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Saturday April 22, 2017 @01:43PM (#14173659)
> First, it can assume the programmer is infallible and will never make a mistake, and use that to actually change the code as defined for performance reasons.

You keep saying that it changed the code. It didn't. It compiled exactly what the code said. You dislike C, and that's OK, but that doesn't mean that a C compiler compiling C code into machine language that is semantically equivalent to the C code is somehow changing the program. It's not.

> That is, it's trivial because the hard work of detecting the problem cases is already being done.

No, it's not, you are still committing the same fallacy as before. The compiler doesn't "collect knowledge about undefined behaviour in the program", because that is useless knowledge for the compiler.

The compiler collects knowledge that helps it reason about the program. A big part of that is tracking the range of values variables can take on. That is information that is useful in selecting how to express certain code in machine code. Undefined behaviour plays into this because operations that are defined to have undefined behaviour have no results that need to be considered as possible values of the variable that the result is stored in. So, if the compiler sees an if(x>0&&y>0){ x+=y;x/=2; }, with x and y being ints, it can derive that x will be positive, and therefore, for example, the division can be compiled to a right-shift.

There is no code in the compiler that goes "well, there is this pointer dereference, so let's remove the NULL-check branch". It's rather that the dereference limits the range of possible values of the pointer to non-NULL values, which a later stage then uses to determine that the branch cannot ever be taken, and thus can be eliminated. The same "knowledge" could be inferred from an assignment of a constant, for example, or from a preceding check ... the compiler tracks the value, not whether undefined behaviour could happen.

> Currently many C compilers default to optimizing for performance, the first options above. They could, and many think should at a minimum default to safety instead. We know people aren't infallible, so acting like they are has no basis in reality.

That's completely tautological. Every programming language assumes the programmer to be infallible. Every compiler and interpreter does what the program means according to the language spec, and if the programmer fails to express what they mean in the language, the program will do the wrong thing.

Now, there is an argument to be had over what kind of semantics of a language are easier to reason about than others, and to construct languages that make reasoning about the code as easy as possible, and some of that can be applied to adding additional restraints in a C compiler on top of the language specification, to make the language as understood by the compiler easier to reason about (while still staying within what the C spec defines, so as to stay compatible with existing, correct C code).

But there are two major problems with your reasoning here:

(1) Distuinguishing programming mistakes and legitimately optimizable code is far harder than you think. You are just handwaving through that part, but that's actually the hard part. You will either miss a lot of optimization opportunity, or you will catch close to none of the relevant mistakes. If you think you have the solution to tell those cases apart much better than current compilers do, please write a paper about it, compiler writers certainly will be interested.

(2) Performance is actually kindof central to C. If you don't need performance, you probably should just not be writing C in the first place. And if you actually need performance, just erring on the side of safety isn't necessarily gonna cut it. The question is not whether you could add all of the safety features of, I dunno, python, to C. The question is what you would expect the result to look like? There is a reason why C code tends to be faster than python, and part of that is the lack of safety.

To maybe get an idea of why compilers do assume signed overflow to be undefined behaviour, this article seems to give a good overview: https://kristerw.blogspot.de/2016/02/how-undefined-signed-ov...

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Saturday April 22, 2017 @02:49PM (#14174048)
> You keep saying that it changed the code. It didn't. It compiled exactly what the code said.

From the submitted article: Thus, the compiler removes this part of the check. It did not compile what the code said, it compiled what it determined it needed to compile. That determination included an assumption of what values a variable could be based on whether they could overflow, which would be undefined. That's the whole point.

The code specfied to test whether "target < segmentStart", and the compiler determined that could never be true and removed that check. We have in this bug report direct evidence that the compiler was too aggressive in its assumptions, as it is indeed possible. It was too aggressive for exactly the reasons I have been going over, which is to say that condition can only never be true as long as the programmer protects the actual values being used from being large enough to cause an overflow in the prior statement.

> It's rather that the dereference limits the range of possible values of the pointer to non-NULL values, which a later stage then uses to determine that the branch cannot ever be taken, and thus can be eliminated.

The check in question (in the compiler in question) specifically uses an assumption that the programmer will prevent an overflow which would be undefined. That is the assumption of infallibility I'm referring to.

> That's completely tautological. Every programming language assumes the programmer to be infallible.

No, they don't. If they did, Java, Rust and just about every dynamic language would never do bounds checks. One of the main reasons for a type system is to force the programmer to follow rules to prevent mistakes.

> Distuinguishing programming mistakes and legitimately optimizable code is far harder than you think.

At this point I'm referring to a specific type of optimization that they are doing that I think rests on shaky presumptions.Removing that optimization is not hard work. It may be hard for the community to stomach, depending on how much performance impact it has.

> Performance is actually kindof central to C. If you don't need performance, you probably should just not be writing C in the first place. And if you actually need performance, just erring on the side of safety isn't necessarily gonna cut it.

I gave a specific example for how to get the same performance if this particular type of optimization was made more conservative. Performance is important, but when it comes to performance or correctness, correctness should win. Full stop.

Very little of what I'm referring to at this point is theoretical. I'm referring to real world situations, mostly the one these comments are in response to. Your comments seem to indicate you think this situation isn't possible. Can you clarify on whether you think the bug report is wrong, or whether I'm incorrect in my assessment of what the bug report is saying, or whether I'm misinterpreting your point? At this point, I'm under the impression that much of what I'm stating is fact, so I'm not sure how to interpret statements such as "It compiled exactly what the code said." as anything but wrong, but that's not getting us anywhere.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Saturday April 22, 2017 @04:14PM (#14174493)
> It did not compile what the code said,

Yes, it did--that seems to be your fundamental confusion.

What that code means is determined by the specification of the C language, and only the specification of the C language. You constantly keep implying stuff that you think, or hope, or would prefer the code means, but that is completely irrelevant for the question of what the code actually means. Just because some intuitive reading of the characters that make up the code makes you assume that it should means a certain thing, does not make it so.

That code does not mean "check for overflow", no matter how much you wish it did. And because it doesn't mean that, the compiler didn't translate it as that either.

> No, they don't. If they did, Java, Rust and just about every dynamic language would never do bounds checks. One of the main reasons for a type system is to force the programmer to follow rules to prevent mistakes.

You are completely missing the point, essentially due to the same confusion as above. I didn't say that those languages didn't have bounds checks. I said that they assume that the programmer is infallible. Every programming language specifies exactly what each syntactic construct means, and which syntactic constructs don't mean anything, and what the runtime behaviour is, and where it is undefined. That is what makes a programming language a programming language. It is the job of the programmer to translate what they mean into the syntax of the respective programming language. If the programmer makes a mistake in this translation, the programm will be wrong, and it will not do what the programmer meant it to do, no matter which programming language they are using--in that sense, every programming language expects the programmer to be infallible.

The difference between programming languages is not whether they allow you to make mistake (none does or ever will), but how difficult it is (mentally) to avoid making mistakes.

> I gave a specific example for how to get the same performance if this particular type of optimization was made more conservative. Performance is important, but when it comes to performance or correctness, correctness should win. Full stop.

That's completely besides the point. Nobody is saying we should have incorrect code (well, ok, some misguided people probably do, but they aren't really part of this discussion). The question is how we are going to achieve that, and that is ultimately a question of economics: What is the easiest/cheapest way to get the greatest amount of software into a state where its execution matches what the programmer intended? Just claiming that we should throw infinite resources at the problem doesn't actually help the problem disappear.

> Can you clarify on whether you think the bug report is wrong, or whether I'm incorrect in my assessment of what the bug report is saying, or whether I'm misinterpreting your point?

Really none of those, I think. I think the way you think about the problem is just confused, which makes it difficult to nail down why exactly your suggested solutions aren't really solutions.

> I'm under the impression that much of what I'm stating is fact, so I'm not sure how to interpret statements such as "It compiled exactly what the code said." as anything but wrong, but that's not getting us anywhere.

I hope I maybe managed to explain that above? I think that's really at the core of your confusion: You are mixing up what you intuitively think things mean and what things mean according to the appropriate formal definition in the respective context. But code in particular does not mean anything, except for what the formal specification of the respective language defines, and that can deviate arbitrarily far from your intuitive understanding.

It's a bit like false friends in natural languages: Just because you know a word from one language, doesn't mean the same word cannot mean something completely different in another language, and it's just confused to use the vocabulary of one language to determine the meaning of a sentence in a different lanugage.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Saturday April 22, 2017 @05:39PM (#14174975)
> Yes, it did--that seems to be your fundamental confusion.

No, it compiled what it determined it had to, based on the C standard. There is a difference. The code, as written, specified a certain set of actions to be taken. The compiler determined some of those directions need not me translated to machine code, and thus did not, but they were specified nonetheless.

To say that the compiler did not remove any code, or directions to be carried out, when translating to machine code, is to subscribe to a torturous and unuseful definition of the terms we have been using.

Of the actions specified by the programmer in the source file, one of which was optimized out in the translation of that source specification to machine code. This change alters the execution path of the program when it is present, and to such a degree that without the optimization the program would halt almost immediately, but with the optimization it allows an out of bounds memory access.

We are not arguing whether the C standard allows this. We are arguing whether the C compilers should do this. There is a distinct difference. Stating that no code was removed has been extremely unhelpful to this conversation, regardless of whether you think it is a technically correct statement. In the generated machine code, a condition of a branch statement does not exist in the version with optimization, but does without it.

The fact that this particular optimization relied on a case where the programmer specified a statement that depending on values not knowable to the compiler at the time of compilation may have resulted in undefined behavior or not makes this a poor optimization to carry out.

> Just because you know a word from one language, doesn't mean the same word cannot mean something completely different in another language, and it's just confused to use the vocabulary of one language to determine the meaning of a sentence in a different lanugage.

Perhaps you could actually address a point I've made instead of arguing over the words used. You are arguing over a technicality of the instead of the topic at hand.

Feel free to reply, I'll read it, but I'm done with this conversation beyond that.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC on Saturday April 22, 2017 @09:33PM (#14175925)
> The code, as written, specified a certain set of actions to be taken.

That's a nonsensical statement. "The code, as written" doesn't have any meaning, other than perhaps what you make up in your mind, which is not a useful reference for discussion, unless you also explain what you interpret it to mean.

I understand that maybe you do not actually mean this literally, and that you maybe are just using somewhat imprecise language to get the idea across--the problem is that exactly in the details that you are not spelling out are the problems that this discussion is all about.

> To say that the compiler did not remove any code, or directions to be carried out, when translating to machine code, is to subscribe to a torturous and unuseful definition of the terms we have been using.

No, quite to the contrary. Those definitions might not be useful for day-to-day programming work, but they are exactly the definitions that you need to clearly discuss compiler behaviour, because those are the definitions that the compiler is using, and the compiler is using those definitions because they match the concepts of how you build a compiler.

> Of the actions specified by the programmer in the source file, one of which was optimized out in the translation of that source specification to machine code. This change alters the execution path of the program when it is present

No, there is no "change", that's just confused language. There is a difference between compilation results, but neither of those is in any way the "real" thing, while the other is "changed", they are both equally valid mappings from C to machine code, with one arguably being closer to the intention of the programmer and thus maybe more useful in this specific case.

> We are not arguing whether the C standard allows this. We are arguing whether the C compilers should do this.

The problem is that those are inextricably interlinked, because the compiler must still stay within the bounds of the standard, and still produce code with reasonably good performance.

> Stating that no code was removed has been extremely unhelpful to this conversation, regardless of whether you think it is a technically correct statement.

The point is not that it's a technically correct statement, the point is that that's not necessarily how the compiler "thinks", so it's often unhelpful in discussing compiler behaviour to talk about "removing code".

> In the generated machine code, a condition of a branch statement does not exist in the version with optimization, but does without it.

It just so happens that in this case, the compilation result without optimization was closer to the programmer's intention than with optimization. But the usefulness of this observation is severely limited because in other cases the exact opposite could be true. The programmer wrote something different than what they meant, and the compiler in some situation produced code that still matched the intention of the programmer ...

> The fact that this particular optimization relied on a case where the programmer specified a statement that depending on values not knowable to the compiler at the time of compilation may have resulted in undefined behavior or not makes this a poor optimization to carry out.

Except that if a C compiler avoided all optimizations for which this is true, a lot of code would be a lot slower. You seem to only be seeing some specific cases for which the performance difference is negligible, and the risk of the optimization is obvious to you, and your imprecise use of language doesn't make discussing this any easier. What you don't seem to realize is how much optimization a C compiler does that is perfectly safe that the compiler cannot easily, if at all, distinguish from this arguably dangerous case, which is why the compiler could only choose to either in many cases produce unnecessarily slow code, or use the current strategy and occasionally produce code that does something else than what the programmer had in mind.

> Perhaps you could actually address a point I've made instead of arguing over the words used. You are arguing over a technicality of the instead of the topic at hand.

Your point is incoherent because you are using imprecise language, which makes it difficult to address. That's why I am addressing your imprecise use of language first.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by klodolph on Friday April 21, 2017 @01:22PM (#14167445)
I think there's a misunderstanding here—the undefined behavior occurs at runtime, not at compile time, so rejecting it outright at compile time is not a sensible solution (it's not sensible to reject something if you don't even know that it happens). The modern purpose of undefined behavior is to enable these kinds of optimizations anyway, so I can write:

    int *x = some_call();
    ...
    *x = 5;
    ...
    if (x == NULL)
        abort();
The compiler will optimize out the abort(), which is a good optimization since obviously x can't be NULL otherwise *x = 5; would be wrong. You might say that the programmer should be responsible for removing the abort()—but it might be inlined from a different function or something like that. Rejecting the program with an error would seriously piss me off. We want our compiler to be aggressive about optimization under the assumption that if we write clean, standards-conformant code, the compiler will optimize out any bounds checks that it can prove will pass, so we can be free to put bounds checks everywhere and get good performance. That's hard, and it's not obvious that it's hard, and people routinely underestimate how hard it is to write standards-conformant C. There are a lot of alternative ideas in the pipeline but we don't automatically get to blame the compiler vendor, even though sometimes it really has been the compiler's fault.

People get rather riled up about undefined behavior. There is a good subset of people who rather like fast C code (optimizing out paths with UB can make code much faster), and a good subset of people who think C should just be safe and predictable. If you want safe and predictable, C is a tough sell.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Friday April 21, 2017 @02:42PM (#14168163)
Arguing the extremes of this as people tend to do about this is not constructive. A compiler flag that warned or errored on branches that were optimized out but the branch included an abort or exit within a certain distance (AST nodes?) of the branch would be useful. Possibly even disallowing optimizing our that conditional that branch if it can be determined it contains any sort of exit or abort before returning control flow.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by naasking on Friday April 21, 2017 @03:14PM (#14168466)
> I think there's a misunderstanding here—the undefined behavior occurs at runtime, not at compile time, so rejecting it outright at compile time is not a sensible solution (it's not sensible to reject something if you don't even know that it happens).

Except the compiler clearly knows that it does happen since it elides the code because of it.

> The compiler will optimize out the abort(), which is a good optimization since obviously x can't be NULL otherwise *x = 5; would be wrong.

This isn't an optimization based on undefined behaviour, it's actually a perfectly standard dataflow analysis that even languages with fully defined behaviour would implement.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by klodolph on Friday April 21, 2017 @04:02PM (#14168959)
> Except the compiler clearly knows that it does happen since it elides the code because of it.

That's definitely the opposite of what's happening here. The compile believes that it does not happen and therefore removes the code.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kbenson on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:43PM (#14170529)
It's actually an interaction between those two aspects which causes the problem. The compiler makes an assumption that something can't be true because that would mean undefined behavior (and of course the programmer isn't doing something that's undefined), and then a later optimization uses that fact to determine code that tests for that exact undefined behavior could never be run, and removes it. The reasoning by itself is not problematic without it's later use in optimization decisions, and the optimization decisions are not problematic without unfounded reasoning about undefined behavior.

I think that's why people are so caught up on this. Technically, neither action is a problem, but together they obviously caused a problem. Either one in isolation doesn't look all that horrible (even if the undefined behavior reasoning is pushing it).

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by masklinn on Friday April 21, 2017 @05:30AM (#14164136)
> For people claiming that this is a compiler bug, it really is not.

In fact TFA specifically points that out multiple times.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by mpweiher on Friday April 21, 2017 @06:46AM (#14164411)
Claims don't become true by repetition.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by infimum on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:40AM (#14164981)
does anyone know, how hard it would be to have a compiler flag -Wundefined that tells me when i write code with undefined behaviour? this way i can fix these issues myself and don't have to rely on the compiler inferring my intentions.
Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by kutkloon7 on Friday April 21, 2017 @08:51AM (#14165073)
GCC has -fsanitize=undefined. I don't think it detects all kinds of undefined behavior (I haven't tried it myself). You should be able to find more information if you please.

Edit: mannykannot noted somewhere else that clang has the same flag.

Re:Cap'n'Proto remote vuln: pointer overflow check optimized... by staticassertion on Friday April 21, 2017 @09:37AM (#14165437)
These are runtime sanitizers designed to aid testing and fuzzing, not meant for running in production software. It involves instrumentation.