The problem is that www.victim.example/evil.js doesn't exist, and never did, but your browser won't know that if it's in the cache -- this gives you a way of faking files existing on other servers at the URL of your choice, and as long as they're in the cache you'll get away with it.
and from [2]:
0. evil.example hosts evil.js, <script src=evil.js integrity=foo>.
1. you visit evil.example and the browser stores evil.js with the cache key "foo".
2. you visit victim.example which has an XSS vulnerability, but victim.example thinks it is safe because it uses Content Security Policy and does not allow inline scripts or scripts form evil domains.
3. the XSS attack is loading <script src=www.victim.example/evil.js hash=foo>
4. the browser detects that "foo" is a known hash key and loads the evil.js from cache. Thinking that the file is hosted on victim.example - when the file is in fact not even present.
5. the evil.js script executes in the context of victim.example, even though they use a Content Security Policy to prevent XSS from being exploitable.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10310594 [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10311555 [3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10312333
(parts first posted here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13493407#13495482)
[5] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13495482 [6] https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-subresource-integrity/issue...
You create a salt, send it to server.
The server adds the salt to the file, hashes it, then sends the hash back. You check this against the cached data.
When the hash doesn't match, you know either the cached version, or the server version, is wrong.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/If...
Not that many people use CSP, but that's the excuse I've heard for not allowing cross-origin caching.