News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Possible routes for distributed anti-abuse systems by pjc50 on Wednesday April 05, 2017 @10:27AM (#14042286)
Filters deal with the situation where A is sending to B something that B doesn't want to recieve.

The situation where A is sending to B something that's harmful to C cannot be dealt with by C's filtering and can only be addressed at a higher level in the system.

Those are the technical distinctions, but there's a lot of possible things covered by the second case: leaked nudes, lynch mob organisation, slander, leaked intelligence, compromised party documents, names of human rights activists being leaked to secret police, copyright infringement, child porn, fake news, real news in fake states, allegations that invitations to pizza are evidence of child porn, and so on.

Re:Possible routes for distributed anti-abuse systems by yummyfajitas on Wednesday April 05, 2017 @10:34AM (#14042342)
Other things covered by this case include leaks identifying corrupt behaviors, allegations of sexual harassment such as Susan fowlers, and evidence of human rights violations that the authorities wish suppressed.

Or various right wing ideas now softly suppressed on Twitter/Reddit.

Re:Possible routes for distributed anti-abuse systems by someguydave on Wednesday April 05, 2017 @11:23PM (#14047686)
>The situation where A is sending to B something that's harmful to C cannot be dealt with by C's filtering and can only be addressed at a higher level in the system.

Huh? If C knows A's public key and the content is signed, why can't C filter A's content?

Re:Possible routes for distributed anti-abuse systems by pjc50 on Thursday April 06, 2017 @04:28AM (#14048868)
Content is basically never signed, and I'm talking about situations where the content isn't intended for or sent to C.