Large areas of philosophy are routinely demolished by the strangeness revealed by science. Concepts like Time after general relativity, the reach of maths after Godel, existence being coexistence after the discovery of multiverses. Philosophy very often assumes things that the real world ends up proving aren't true.

> existence being coexistence after the discovery of multiverses

Please keep in mind that multiverses haven't actually been discovered. They are a very real possibility if the model of inflation of the early universe (and thus eternal inflation) is correct. But since the Planck satellite hasn't found conclusive b-mode polarisation patterns, inflationary models should be viewed with a bit of scepticism. On the other hand: inflation can explain a lot of problems in the early universe that would arise without it: magnetic monopoles, the large-scale homogenity and isotropy and geometric flatness. So, it remains a valid model, and the best explanation of the very early universe.

We should be aware of the things we don't know, and not just assume multiverses, when there is no conclusive evidence.

Multiverses as a result of space receding faster than speed of light are pretty much universally accepted. Other kinds are more controversial. There are galaxies not co-existant with us in the future that are now.

Ahh, I see, we were talking about different concepts of the multivese then. I'd consider your definition of multiverses still as part of our own universe, just not our observable universe. But I think this is more a question of definition...

For the existence and coexistence they amount to the same. There are galaxies now that will leave our co-existance in the future and still exist. Disproves that existence implies co-existence.

Are you sure you're not just more familiar with science than with philosophy? I don't think any of those examples hold up under the slightest scrutiny. Philosophy is mostly demolished by better philosophy.

Philosophy of science is very relevant and more difficult than ever. But you couldn't do philosophy of quantum mechanics before the science of quantum mechanics. When I say philosophy I mean metaphysics or in general attempts to explain the natural world. A lot of that has been made redundant by science. Not ethics.

Modern scientists don't usually like philosophy and don't write about this stuff from a philosophical point of view. It's more necessary than ever that philosophers get with the program. Pretending that science hasn't taken the lead in explaining the natural world won't help. People like Nick Bostrom who think about what science reveals do, even though he's probably hated in philosophy circles, like Daniel Dennett or Lawrence Krauss are.

Scientists in academia are often ignorant of philosophy; this seems to be a side-effect of increasing specialization and corresponding tunnel vision.

Science as an empirical practice of truth-seeking is reliant on philosophy for its foundations. Of course it is possible to "do science" without having any interest in epistemology, just as it is possible to program computers without having any interest in computer science, or to do mathematics without having any interest in mathematical foundations.

Science is a part of philosophy, and at the same time it extends it. You're assuming that philosophy is only idealist guessing, which is wrong.

I mean, you wouldn't say that "Large areas of science are routinely demolished" by newer science, even though strictly speaking it's true, and you'd therefore give up on science as a whole?

(And if I'd really want to be mean, I'd ask you if science has ever even proven the "real world" exists or that science is true, but I think you got my point.)

Science regularly demolishes science too, of course. Scientists don't have a problem with thatm they just move on. But in my opinion philosophers do.

I know philosophy is extremely rigorous. Science is fiddly, it works in approximations. Philosophers hate ad hocs postulates like dark matter or cosmological constants. They hate not knowing how certain things work. That's part of the problem. They need to apply their rigor to theories that have the chance of being false.

That's an extreme generalisation. Yes, there are philosphers and philosophies that would reject these things, but it's absurd to assume that all do.

You also have to remember that science operates within it's own framework, and assumes concepts of truth that are accepted within this community, such as the scientific method to gain knowledge. But these are presumed to be true, without anyone having had proven them.

Philosophy on the other hand, as a more general subject, even questions these frameworks and has to operate without any pre-given framework. A Platonist won't be shunned by a scientific discovery, since it isn't a threat to it's epistemological framework.

Therefore I say that science is part of philosophy, but this doesn't mean it's wrong or bad. Everyday life proves it's helpfulness. One just has to keep in mind, that there is no proof it's ultimately true, and that all objections are "appeals to emotion". Followers of Scientism, even though they wouldn't say it themselves, do this, dogmatically believing that they are the true way and that's the problem everyone has with them. (I'm not saying it's better when Platonists or anyone else does it, but the others are more common nowadays)

Not all do, but I'd say there's a real disconnect between the disciplines when there should be more teamwork.

If Philosophy is going to argue that the scientific method doesn't work, or that the world doesn't exist, we can't trust our senses or stuff like that, go ahead. Has there been any practical advancement on this line of thinking in the last 50 years? do you envision that the scientific method will be revised by anything discovered in philosophy?

>I'd say there's a real disconnect between the disciplines when there should be more teamwork

Could you explain what you mean with this?

>If Philosophy is going to argue that the scientific method doesn't work

The critique isn't as blunt as you make it out to be. Philosophers argue that the scientific method isn't the ultimate epistemological tool to find out everything and to understand all there is to know.

>that the world doesn't exist >we can't trust our senses or stuff like that

Just as a side note, this hasn't been disproven, since it's beyond the reach of science. Science, as a materialist/physicalist philosophy presumes itself to be true, while at they same time limiting itself.

>Has there been any practical advancement on this line of thinking in the last 50 years?

What do you mean with "practical advancement"? For one to ask or answer this question seriously, one has to take a lot of things for granted and such as concepts of "practical" or "advancement". And what's so special about the last 50 years?

>do you envision that the scientific method will be revised by anything discovered in philosophy?

Philosophy as a discipline isn't science, you don't "discover" things, since that presumes these truths to be out there, ready to be found, which doesn't mean that people don't search for them.

But besides that, what do you mean with "revised"? The critique isn't as already mentioned, that the scientific method isn't right (it most certainly is a very good tool regarding science itself), but that it can't be the only one, used to find out everything. That's just naive positivism.

Science also doesn't rely only on the scientific method. It relies mainly on maths and logic. Here both philosophy and science meet.

What I mean is that every time this debate happens it's the same a lot of "what do you mean by that?" And "define achievement". My thesis is that as a tool to gain knowledge about the natural world philosophy is not helpful anymore because the parts that are useful, logic and argumental rigor, are integrated in science already. Philosophy is still useful in ethics and morals but not useful in epistemology and metaphysics unless they follow modern science, which very few do.

Well I don't disagree with your thesis in principle, I'm just adding that science is part of philosophy, as it too seeks to find out what is true and what not. And after all, logic and mathematics come from philosophy - there is no clear distinction between the two.

If you are talking about idealist philosophy, and are asking yourself how much their theories on the true substance of the world has contributed to the general wellbeing of the average human being, then I already said, that most people would agree that the products of science, as a materialist philosophy, are more helpful.

Yes you can argue science is part of philosophy, all is. I don't disagree. But there's been a divergence of not in principle, in practice. Philosophy departments and science departments barely talk in my opinion. 50 years ago it was different I think. The copnehaguen school of quantum physics, Bohr and all those guys, read and engaged in philosophy. Nowadays feels like there's a real disconnect. Not long ago discussing with a philosophy professor he told me that "those ignorant monkeys at MIT think they know everything and it's just pseudoscience". There's an feeling of entrenching within philosophy and of disinterest within Science. Another example is those silly Lawrence Krauss feuds with philosophers over his book about "nothing". Science is so strange nowadays, we need a philosophical treatment to make sense of multiverses, inflation, quantum interpretations, etc. Maybe it's more my biased impression than reality, I would be happy to be pointed to work along these lines.

The existence of multiverses is philosophy.

> discovery of multiverses

Theorization of multiverses...

See my other answer to a comment that said the same thing.

Is philosophy knowledge? Can I use it, for example, to take an informed choice about the real world? Does it at least contain a set of verifiable, falsifiable statements that every practitioner can and has agreed upon?

Surely philosophy of science helps you build your framework of verifiable, falsifiable statements (after all, you need to have a logical framework for choosing which statements can be falsified or verified)!

> Can I use it, for example, to take an informed choice about the real world?

I might remembering it wrong, but I think one of the main questions asked by Socrates was "how can we be good persons?". And "what does 'good' mean?". That question absolutely does inform my every-day choices about the real world, because me not being a religious person and not believing in the after-life and such I base most of my every-day thingies on thinking if what I'm actually doing is "good" or not. Asking yourself that is a philosophical question. That and a little bit of Kant, and his "people should never be means to an end".

One could argue that it is because of philosophy (of science) that you even consider "a set of verifiable, falsifiable statements that every practitioner can and has agreed upon" as a litmus test (or demarcation criterion) for what science is supposed to be.