Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by quotemstr on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @03:01AM
(#13928970)
Well, look on the bright side: once we eliminate the boring old memory safety bugs, and the XSS, and the SQL injection, the exploits that remain will at least be interesting.
Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by orblivion on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @10:30AM
(#13931174)
And they'll have time to deal with them.
Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by hueving on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @05:11AM
(#13929463)
If you really wanted to fish for a "told ya so", someone could just point out that by eliminating all of those other classes of bugs, developers could have spent more time looking for logic errors.
Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by empath75 on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @08:59AM
(#13930509)
Will you have time for that after fighting the borrow checker?
Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by simion314 on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @09:17AM
(#13930629)
If a developer finishes his task he will be given a new task, I don't think you will get a task "go and review our code again for weird logic errors" you will be sent to add a new feature or fix a bug, so you will work on that and create a few new bugs.
Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by nullc on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @07:23AM
(#13930039)
I got that while trolling Rust developers a bit on this point, and had to concede-- it's a fair point.
I do think that rust doesn't (yet) have enough affordances for formal verification of algorithmic correctness-- but if you're not chasing memory safety you have more time to deal with other issues.
Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by pjmlp on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @04:30AM
(#13929311)
If we remove memory corruption errors, that it already one less class of errors to worry about.
As for the <whatever type safe systems programming language> crowd, these complaints have been done in the past by fairly unknown people like C. A. R. Hoare, Niklaus Wirth, James G. Mitchell, Alan Kay, Luca Cardelli,.... so what do they know about computers.
Re:QEMU: user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation ...
by thesz on Wednesday March 22, 2017 @09:18AM
(#13930631)
Range checking is done deal with sufficiently strong types (read - dependent types). It was done in the Epigram LONG time ago, ten years ago if not more.
For example, when you fetching bytes for decode you can type-check that you are in the quota and act accordingly.
Interesting, and not your usual type of exploit. Guessing this isn't one that will have the Rust crowd doling out "told ya so" :). Logic error only. No buffer overflow, not much strong types do for you, etc.