I don't trust signal, a centralized that requires a phone number while pretending to be secure and providing some anonymity is flawed by design and begging to be exploited.
http://technosociology.org/?page_id=1687
Get off the FUD brigade.
FWIW, I strongly disagree with this stance: if the recipient's key changes while the message is in-flight, that message should never be resent/delivered without the sender's explicit approval. Imagine that Bob is a political activist planning a protest. Bob is wondering why his IMs to a co-conspirator Alice aren't being delivered; Bob's wonder turns to fear when he hears on the news that Alice has been detained. Fear turns into terror when Bob sees his messages subsequently get two blue ticks as WhatsApp happily delivers his IMs to a new phone belonging to the secret police. Only afterwards does WhatsApp notify Bob that Alice's key has changed
> Wasn't whatsapp all over the news for its "replace the encryption key transparently without notifying the user" feature ? Also facebook.
Which was a conscious design decision. Not doing that (even for people that had turned on "notify on key changes"), would let whatsapp know which users could be securely MITM'd. Neither is a very good choice, but an understandable trade-off when it comes to security vs usability.
You can do lots of things when you've owned someone's phone. The big news is that they're targeting phones instead of services.
Given that, it's very peculiar to focus on the services WikiLeaks wants you to be afraid of anyway, when they're mentioned nowhere in the documents.
What would those goals be?
Of course WikiLeaks wants ordinary people to be vaguely afraid of using Signal and WhatsApp. End-to-end encryption is very much counter to their goals.