mh_siphash_digest(input, length, rounds) {
digest := siphash_digest(input, length, rounds)
mhdigest := concat(rounds, digest)
return mhdigest
}
mh_siphash_verify(input, mhdigest) {
mh := multihash.parse(mhdigest)
rounds := mh.digest[0] # the rounds
expected := mh.digest[1:] # rest
actual := siphash_digest(input, mh.length, rounds)
return expected == actual
}One is that the prefix is probably unique for small sets. So it's both easy to read and parse and then use just a prefix for doing something like stopping a docker container.
Second is that a short prefix on a larger set of data is probably not unique but at a rate I can predict. I can take a random, and repeatable, sample of data by selecting everything with the same prefix. This gives me a fast way of taking a random sample from a database (or file or anything else).
> Multihash is a protocol for differentiating outputs from various well-established hash functions, addressing size + encoding considerations. It is useful to write applications that future-proof their use of hashes, and allow multiple hash functions to coexist.[0]
Compare, for instance, multihash's treatment of SHA512 truncated to 256-bits, and the standardised hash function SHA512/256. The paper which introduced SHA512/256 even gives a generic way to safely truncate SHA512: https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/548.pdf section 5.
Multihash's design begs implementations to validate these things by allowing the sender to arbitrarily truncate them. That's bad.
When the functions encourage it, we support the addition of the specific different constructions (if named): https://github.com/multiformats/multihash/blob/master/hashta... -- we did a silly thing with Blake2 where we imported all the valid numbers. (this is suboptimal in table space, but super explicit).
Are there other functions you think we should add for the sha2-256/512 set?
> Multihash's design begs implementations to validate these things by allowing the sender to arbitrarily truncate them
If the sender is manipulating the hash you get (i.e. changing the length prefix counts), you're already in huge trouble. They could change the code and the value too. The threat model here is that the hash you have cannot be altered by the attacker. If the attacker manages to truncate a stream to get you to think it's a shorter hash, the attack fails as you have the length to tell you what you should be expecting. (again, the crux here is that if the attacker can change the length bits they can probably also change the function and own you anyway)
Also-- as noted in https://github.com/multiformats/multihash/issues/70 -- we should make implementations allow clients to lock the hash function and length combinations they want to use, so that attackers cannot manipulate those parameters.
The page goes through a bunch of examples of how a multihash would work in practice, why it is useful to do this, and goes through some FAQs.
I'm writing a post about all this that I'll push out soon, but wanted to drop the site here now.
Please, as you make new systems or start to upgrade your systems out of SHA1 (or MD5!!!), please use Multihash so that your upgrades will be much, much easier in the future. This makes rolling up a matter of recompiling some tools, and by far not facing the horrible breakages that occur when tools and scripts assume certain things (like the hash digest of git will always be 160bits... now git faces breaking a lot of things and may have to stick with 160bits of a truncated SHA3 or BLAKE2...)
Oh also-- definitely check out BLAKE2, it's a fantastic hash function from Zooko, JP Aumasson, Samuel Neves, and Christian Winnerlein -- https://blake2.net -- use it for all your hashing needs! So much faster than SHA2, and has the same "unbrokenness" that SHA3 enjoys. (And, I believe deep cryptanalysis has gone into BLAKE, Keccak is not particularly safer)
The Multiformats site also has a Multiaddr description, but that's far from complete and doesn't have the examples. The other multiformats arent well explained on the website yet. Sorry, coming soon :) we wanted to get this out ASAP -- PR's accepted at https://github.com/multiformats/website (oh and yes, TLS certs coming too)