I don't think that comparison is quite right: ten years ago we already had two of Xiaoyun Wang's attacks which significantly reduced the work factor to break SHA-1. They were already cited at the time as reasons to move away from the algorithm (and I doubt we'd be able to do the 2⁸⁰ work needed to get a collision without cryptanalytic research! — notably the successful Stevens attack today reported performing a total of 2⁶³ hash operations while claiming to be "one of the largest computations ever completed").

There's also important concern about SHA-512 (which has led to SHA-3 and other options), but I'm not sure it can be put in the same category; at least all of the best attacks today are significantly reduced-round.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2#Cryptanalysis_and_valida...

By contrast, Wang's original attack (which we had more than 10 years ago) achieved a 2¹¹ speedup for collisions against full SHA-1 and her second attack later the same year achieved 2¹⁷ speedup.

Evidently the speedup for the final version of Stevens's attack (which worked) was also around 2¹⁷. By contrast, a Moore's law improvement over 10 years would only be expected to make computers around 2⁶ times faster! (At the risk of mixed or mangled metaphors, we might say that mathematical insight during the time period you mention has been about 2¹¹ times more useful for attacking SHA-1 than computer power increases.)

Edit: someone else linked to Valerie Aurora's chart, which I'd forgotten about, which gives a synopsis of the historical status of the most popular hashes. On that chart, SHA-1 from 2005 was one category worse ("Weakened") than SHA-512 is today ("Minor weakness").

http://valerieaurora.org/hash.html