"If indeed qualia are identical to certain functional informational processes, then the hard problem of consciousness (what Chalmers more or less takes to be the easy problem) is the empirical one of discovering just what these processes are."
But why should certain "functional informational processes" be a certain experience? Even if Clark is correct it doesn't seem to really explain anything. I'm not sure it's even scientific; is it at all testable?
It seems to me that no one has come up with a good explanation of what consciousness is, or even made any sort of dent in the problem. Saying that consciousness is the physical experience of the brain, or that it's quantum mechanics, or it's an illusion or whatever are interesting guesses but they haven't led us anywhere.
If the brain's activity _did_ somehow give rise to experience, wouldn't _this_ experience--the one you are having right now, reading this sentence, thinking these thoughts, breathing, etc, even the sensation of the redness of red--have to be exactly that? Moreover, if the brain's activity gave rise to a _different_ experience, then we'd experience _that_ instead. In other words, _if_ there is an experience that is _produced_ by the signaling behavior of brain, then _this_ must be it.
Yeah, I am with Dennett and the others that think the Hard Problem is basically made up. My thinking is pretty close to what Thomas W. Clark has written on the subject (http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/consciousness/the-expla... basically, that your consciousness and awareness actually _is_ the experience that your physical brain is having in response to stimuli and self-reflection.