Re:Announcing gopass – A 'pass' compatible password manager ...
by e12e on Thursday February 02, 2017 @04:29PM
(#13554833)
You're aware of an attack on RSA that weakens it when a short random string is encrypted with a handful of RSA keys as opposed to a single key?
Afaik supplying multiple ids to gpg simply re-encryps the same symmetric key for multiple recipients - the plaintext is turned into a single cipher text.
Re:Announcing gopass – A 'pass' compatible password manager ...
by hackcasual on Thursday February 02, 2017 @07:05PM
(#13556331)
There is an attack against RSA if you encrypt very small values with a small exponent and insecure padding. GPG generates a large symmetric encryption key, and uses that to encrypt the message, uses 65537 (as is considered good practice) as its exponent, and uses a cryptographically appropriate PKCS#1v1.5 padding scheme
As far as I'm aware, there's no reduction in security by encrypting to multiple public keys (other than increased risk of compromising one of the keys).
> Multiple gpg-ids may be specified, in order to encrypt each password with multiple ids.
That should technically reduce security, when encrypting the same secret with multiple IDs, as it gives a potential attacker more data to work with.
I suggest adding some randomness when encrypting with each key and having pass hide it from the end user when decrypting.