Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by empath75 on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:03AM
(#13541721)
This is a stupid headline. They're tripping the request limit from a single ip, which makes you fill out a captcha. We've been hit with that a few times where I work.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by Symbiote on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:15AM
(#13541896)
It's The Register, daft headlines is their style. They imitate the cheap, mass-market newspapers in the UK like The Sun or The Mirror.
The NHS is one of the world's largest employers. If all that traffic is behind a small range of IPs (one wouldn't be enough) I'm not surprised there are issues. It does seem an odd network design though.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by lmm on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:59AM
(#13542403)
> If all that traffic is behind a small range of IPs (one wouldn't be enough) I'm not surprised there are issues. It does seem an odd network design though.
"Plonk all our desktops behind a router, NAT the whole thing" isn't that unusual as a network design.
One would hope that the government in particular would be moving to IPv6 as the socially responsible thing to do.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by Symbiote on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @12:31PM
(#13542796)
It's a bit unusual for an organization with thousands of sites, spread across an entire country. I haven't checked, but it probably has a huge IPv4 allocation too.
I'd expect something more like the university networks.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by kogir on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:08AM
(#13541807)
Or perhaps there is active malware within the NHS network? Why is the immediate assumption that the amount of traffic is not actually an indicator something is wrong?
When I've managed office networks and we've seen the captchas, every time it was traced to actual infections of a few machines. Re-imaging them (and educating users) fixed the problem.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by mseebach on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:35AM
(#13542153)
But this (the e-mail DoS) isn't even an extreme case. When you have on the order of a million accounts, especially when you have large distribution lists, you need to consider this as an expected case (and the best practice solution is pretty well understood: limit send-rights to large distribution lists to the people who need it).
It's depressing how little effort Microsoft invests in trying to fix the obvious brokenness[1] of email (including reply-all) and (especially) calendaring. It's a particular contrast to the often controversially heavy handed actions by Google to "outlaw" insecure internet practises.
1: The brokenness is obvious, the solutions admittedly less so.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by alicewales on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:25AM
(#13542030)
I work in the NHS and regularly get the "I'm not a robot" captcha. I know what it is and why it's there when I see it, but colleagues often complain that their "Google" has a "virus".
A lot of NHS traffic goes through a few large networks like THIS [https://www.this.nhs.uk/home/] which don't have especially large IP allocations.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by arcanus on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:04AM
(#13541750)
I always wonder if in an increasingly automated world, these sort of mishaps will become more common, and take longer to elevate to a human level where it can be fixed.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by ocdtrekkie on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:02AM
(#13541701)
Definitely been in this camp before at previous places I've been. It's particularly crazy that this is happening with NHS, given Google's very public partnership with them to collect and process their medical data through DeepMind.
Re:NHS staff trigger Google cyber-defences
by fredley on Wednesday February 01, 2017 @11:07AM
(#13541787)
The NHS is not a single entity, it is a huge, loose collection of different bodies in a very complex arrangement. The bodies that Google is involved with are likely entirely separate from the ones providing the affected IT service.
The NHS is one of the world's largest employers. If all that traffic is behind a small range of IPs (one wouldn't be enough) I'm not surprised there are issues. It does seem an odd network design though.
"Plonk all our desktops behind a router, NAT the whole thing" isn't that unusual as a network design.
One would hope that the government in particular would be moving to IPv6 as the socially responsible thing to do.
I'd expect something more like the university networks.
When I've managed office networks and we've seen the captchas, every time it was traced to actual infections of a few machines. Re-imaging them (and educating users) fixed the problem.
But no, that is impossible. The NHS is clearly much, much better at running IT than Google is.
I suppose articles like this are a worthy reminder to remember the extreme cases in our engineering
It's depressing how little effort Microsoft invests in trying to fix the obvious brokenness[1] of email (including reply-all) and (especially) calendaring. It's a particular contrast to the often controversially heavy handed actions by Google to "outlaw" insecure internet practises.
1: The brokenness is obvious, the solutions admittedly less so.
A lot of NHS traffic goes through a few large networks like THIS [https://www.this.nhs.uk/home/] which don't have especially large IP allocations.