If the authorities take your device out of your sight, and you're sufficiently paranoid, then discard it and buy fresh hardware.

I mean you can do whatever you want but only the encryption is going to do you any good for actual security. Even if you make it really convincing that the drives are empty, procedure is still going to make them plug it into the copier anyways. I mean, from the article, they're confiscating headphones and power cords - there's no rhyme or reason here except intimidation; the agents don't investigate - someone else does.

Do what you like, but it sounds like hassle you're adding to what is going to happen anyways.

This depends entirely on the context. If you're a high-value target to an intelligence agency, there's a very high probability they would have someone pose as an agent of the TSA or CBP, or that they would have one of those agencies grant them access to your electronics. Someone involved in the publication of leaks or creation of security-related software would count as a high-value target.

they're confiscating headphones and power cords - there's no rhyme or reason here except intimidation

This, too depends on context. For the average person, the purpose is obviously nothing more than harassment. It's not difficult for a flash drive to be concealed inside a USB cable though, and if you're being targeted for a search, it makes sense for them to take everything.

On the other hand, a MicroSD card can be hidden just about anywhere, so if they're not going through all your stuff with a fine-toothed comb, the whole thing is theater.

They have threatened to shoot a presidential plane flying over Europe and searched it on the possibility that Snowden might be on board. So yes be aware when you are a person of interest.

My objection to the commenter's idea was pretty much that they're going out of their way to create a scenario in which it looks like the drive doesn't contain data, but unless you are a high value target, all that work would likely go unnoticed since you're just getting a standard agent. Even if you didn't, and you had a recently graduated CS savant as the agent, it seems more likely that there would be no investigation to wonder "should I copy this drive or not" - they'd just do it. Or just confiscate the drive, etc. You can make the effort to try to make the drives look blank, but that feels a lot like theatre. It'll maybe fool someone looking to pull data, but if they just do some raw disk dump like with dd or most forensic tools, I don't think it makes much of a difference. It's just planning for a situation that really wouldn't happen.

>It's not difficult for a flash drive to be concealed inside a USB cable though, and if you're being targeted for a search, it makes sense for them to take everything. On the other hand, a MicroSD card can be hidden just about anywhere, so if they're not going through all your stuff with a fine-toothed comb, the whole thing is theater.

I'm not really sure on what the argument is here. Again, I think if a high priority target is really going through, they're not taking the microsd with them. There are far better ways of moving such data, such as a trusted 3rd party who receives the parcel through a series of proxies or a secure transmission, etc. If you are a high value target or in a dangerous profession or project that you feel warrants protection, there are a myriad of better ways of moving your sensitive data across checkpoints. If we wanted to get really fancy, you could have carrier pigeon or a falcon fly it across the border, or feed it to a dog and wait for the micro sd card to be pooped out.

I'm not saying that we shouldn't be wary and consider protections, but it just feels like this line of thinking in tech crowds tends to lead to incredibly specific scenarios that their solution resolves when many much more practical solutions exist. Under the auspices of fun mental exercise, I think it's fine, but when we're considering these as actual solutions to the very real threat of government searches at check points, then it's just adding bad suggestions.

I heard USB is a finicky thing, rather hard to implement correctly.

I wonder how many of these copier devices (-- are these dedicated DSM-like units? Probably embedded/outdated Linux then!) were already infected and grep copied contents for relevant data.

2. it may not just look random, unless the encryption is done in a way that tries to be plausibly deniable. Not all disk/data encryption methods try to hide their existence.

In practice, you can be barred from entering the US for effectively any reason at all, unless you are a citizen. At the border you have almost no rights at all.

1) use FDE with a LUKS-like scheme where the encryption header can be backed up and then removed (making sure you can restore it at your destination somehow).

2) Destroy the header before travel. Carry live media if you need to use the machine while traveling but keep it minimally provisioned (nothing personal on there).

3) Your machine essentially now contains random data (even to you), perhaps except the partition table and/or boot parition(s). Tell the authorities that you "fill your hardisk up with random data before traveling in case of theft."

This is a true statement because: a) without the LUKS header your own data is essentially random, even to you and b) the scheme does protect your data in the event of theft.

Thus you can safely utter it with no bravado.

An even better scheme would use verified boot of some kind so that if the device is confiscated and returned, and its critical to you, you may have some way of proving the boot loader hasn't been tampered with. But I can't speak as to the difficulty of this.

If you have relevant data, then you simply don't cross borders with a device containing such data (or with a computer at all). This is just common sense. This "plausible deniable encryption at the border" nonsense is just a cryptonerds imagination.

Do you have personal data on this device?

and you answer No (when you really do), then you're looking at 5 years in prison under §1001(a)(2). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Making_false_statements

A much better method I have heard is to ship your electronics beforehand, travel with only a burner cellphone, then pick up the electronics after you arrive. Repeat when traveling out of the country.

Better yet, tell them your laptop broke while in the airport before boarding the plane, and you are going to buy a new harddisk/get it serviced when you arrive at your final destination. Much more plausible.

It's a felony to make false or deliberately misleading statements to U.S. border agents. Unless your laptop actually broke while in the airport, performing the scheme you described is a felony.

If you removed a key header which is crucial to the operation of your device in the airport, then the question is whether you can legally say, "my laptop broke in the airport," even if it was you who deliberately broke it.

This also covers the case of the question, "Does this device contain personal data?" To which you can truthfully answer, "Yes."

The point, in my original scenario also is not to lie, but to simply avoid being able to provide access under duress.

Why not whipe the disk and enter with a clean system if it's so critical?

wrt giving up the key under extended duress, I was thinking the same thing and aside from simply wiping the disk I can think of another scheme that might serve you well: give the header to a trusted 3rd party who could simply be the one actually controlling access to your data. Your lawyer for example.

Sounds like a sure-fire way to get them to harass you more and pay closer attention to yourself.

I still believe there is a way to adjust such an encryption scheme to meet the ideal criteria:

1. you're not lying 2. you can't provide access 3. you're not drawing extra attention to yourself

And you just made yourself a suspicious person to be further questioned and searched, while probably committed an offense that could send you to jail.