Your computer can't simply remember the certificate that was used for the last connection, because then sites can never change their certificates (which would be a huge issue).
Moxie mentioned before that using notaries would work, of course you have to worry about notaries being compromised but that's a much easier threat model.
They could, for example, sign the new cert with the old one.
Re:Certified Malice
by willstrafach on Tuesday January 17, 2017 @12:41PM
(#13419429)
What if the certificate's private key is compromised? How would revocation work?
>does literally nothing to prevent MitM attacks
It does more than nothing. Especially if you make the reasonable assumptions that 1) the user is not being MitMed most of the time and 2) the user is likely to have connected to the (small) set of sensitive sites before they experience their first MitM.
Example: my home internet is unadulterated. I check my mail. My computer saves the certificate. I go to a coffee shop. I check my mail again. Somone tries to MitM me. My computer instantly spots a changed certificate.
Obviously we should still use and verify certificates. But I notice a nasty trend of making the perfect the enemy of the good in security. There's a perception that if it's not perfect, it's worse than useless and should be shunned (probably due to historical bad experiences with false senses of security).