>does literally nothing to prevent MitM attacks
It does more than nothing. Especially if you make the reasonable assumptions that 1) the user is not being MitMed most of the time and 2) the user is likely to have connected to the (small) set of sensitive sites before they experience their first MitM.
Example: my home internet is unadulterated. I check my mail. My computer saves the certificate. I go to a coffee shop. I check my mail again. Somone tries to MitM me. My computer instantly spots a changed certificate.
Obviously we should still use and verify certificates. But I notice a nasty trend of making the perfect the enemy of the good in security. There's a perception that if it's not perfect, it's worse than useless and should be shunned (probably due to historical bad experiences with false senses of security).
Not exactly sure what that'd buy...
Edit: You also cannot just discard certificates and use HTTPS as an "I'm talking to the same server I was 5 seconds ago", because that does literally nothing to prevent MitM attacks. If you can't assert that you're talking securely to the domain owner, then there's nothing at all stopping someone in a privileged network position from intercepting and altering your traffic, because they could simply proxy it through their own server.