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Re:Certified Malice by Buge on Monday January 16, 2017 @09:12PM (#13414657)
DV is better than no certificate because it guarantees no one is MITMing just you. It could hypothetically be possible an attacker MITMed both the CA and you, but that's quite hard.

EV has the security benefit over DV in that you can use HPKP to pin EV CA public keys, so no DV certificates will ever be trusted for your site.

Re:Certified Malice by willstrafach on Tuesday January 17, 2017 @12:43PM (#13419446)
> It could hypothetically be possible an attacker MITMed both the CA and you, but that's quite hard.

This statement does not make sense. Could you explain what you are implying here?

Re:Certified Malice by pfg on Tuesday January 17, 2017 @02:02PM (#13420111)
I assume what's meant is that the CA could be MitM'd during the domain ownership verification process, thus issuing a certificate for the attacker, which the attacker can then use to MitM you.

Presumably, MitM'ing the CA's traffic to the domain owner is significantly harder than MitM'ing a random user, though certainly not impossible.

Re:Certified Malice by willstrafach on Wednesday January 18, 2017 @09:25AM (#13426453)
I do not see how that would be possible.
Re:Certified Malice by pfg on Wednesday January 18, 2017 @07:32PM (#13431886)
Anything from cache poisoning of the CA's DNS server, BGP hijacking or pwning any network hop between the CA and the victim would be sufficient. Domain validation is nothing but a DNS query or a HTTP request.