(†) We know that historically NSA had secret cryptography knowledge, the most famous example being differential cryptanalysis and the subsequent hardening of DES (although IBM also knew about that). Since it's a secret agency we cannot know the current state of their secret knowledge; my gut tells me though that since crypto has become a much more open/scientific discipline in the last 10-15 years that they probably don't have much of that anymore.
> I haven't spoken to a cryptographer who believes the NIST curves are backdoored
From what I can infer, I would say this is highly unlikely. That still leaves enough room for things to be interesting, so… nope. I won't touch NIST curves willingly with my current knowledge.
The unbiased randomness issue is with the ECDSA construction, which requires a totally, uniformly random k value for every signature. Bernstein's Ed25519 construction is deterministic, and doesn't have this problem.
I haven't spoken to a cryptographer who believes the NIST curves are backdoored (or, for that matter, in any of the elaborate hocus-pocus around the Brainpool curves being untrustworthy). But the NIST curves are difficult to use safely, which is why nobody likes them.
The NIST backdoor stuff is an argument that appeals more to message board nerds than to practitioners.
(Is NIST itself trustworthy? Fuck no. The Dual_EC CSPRNG seems pretty clearly to have been a backdoor at this point.)