I haven't spoken to a cryptographer who believes the NIST curves are backdoored (or, for that matter, in any of the elaborate hocus-pocus around the Brainpool curves being untrustworthy). But the NIST curves are difficult to use safely, which is why nobody likes them.
The NIST backdoor stuff is an argument that appeals more to message board nerds than to practitioners.
(Is NIST itself trustworthy? Fuck no. The Dual_EC CSPRNG seems pretty clearly to have been a backdoor at this point.)
(†) We know that historically NSA had secret cryptography knowledge, the most famous example being differential cryptanalysis and the subsequent hardening of DES (although IBM also knew about that). Since it's a secret agency we cannot know the current state of their secret knowledge; my gut tells me though that since crypto has become a much more open/scientific discipline in the last 10-15 years that they probably don't have much of that anymore.
> I haven't spoken to a cryptographer who believes the NIST curves are backdoored
From what I can infer, I would say this is highly unlikely. That still leaves enough room for things to be interesting, so… nope. I won't touch NIST curves willingly with my current knowledge.
The unbiased randomness issue is with the ECDSA construction, which requires a totally, uniformly random k value for every signature. Bernstein's Ed25519 construction is deterministic, and doesn't have this problem.
I've heard that Blake was faster than MD5, and just as safe as Keccak. That decided it. I'm glad I did it, because the code is simple, and turned out to use the same ARX design as Chacha20.
Now I can imagine using Keccak instead. But then I'd be tempted to base the entire symmetric cipher-suite on the sponge construction, to share code and cryptanalysis.
The repeated application of simple ARX based rounds is a damn good idea: it's efficient even for software implementations, it's often "naturally" constant time, and it's simple. Implementing this stuff is easy: if it's Valgrind clean and passes the test vectors, it probably works. It also makes audits and reviews much easier.
Similarly, Wegman-Carter authenticators such as Poly1305 are kind of a no-brainer: no forgeries are possible unless you break the cipher itself! Also, fast. Modular arithmetic and potential limb overflow makes them harder to get right but still.
Finally, there is simply no escaping elliptic curves. I don't trust the NIST curves. 25519 is not too complex, fast, and doesn't leave enough space in its constants for a backdoor (DJB made sure the design constraints were tight).
I mostly agree with this article, but I don't mind a monoculture if it means I get boring crypto.