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Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by mannykannot on Friday January 06, 2017 @09:21PM (#13342032)
That looks to me rather like axiarchism, with parsimony as the specific form of goodness.
Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by naasking on Saturday January 07, 2017 @02:10AM (#13342801)
I don't see the connection. Parsimony is important for induction by defining a universal prior. Solomonoff induction formalized this notion by ordering all programs that could generate a particular set of observations by increasing Kolmogorov complexity.
Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by mannykannot on Saturday January 07, 2017 @08:13AM (#13343973)
Are you not conflating 'things that make problems tractable' with 'things that must be'?
Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by naasking on Saturday January 07, 2017 @09:25AM (#13344258)
I don't see how. Firstly, Kolmogorov complexity is incomputable, so it's not technically tractable, it's merely an idealised induction process.

Secondly, assigning a higher probability to an outcome isn't saying that how things are.

Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by mannykannot on Saturday January 07, 2017 @05:14PM (#13346957)
Correspondingly, no claim about the likelihood of an infinite hierarchy of functions is saying how things are.
Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by naasking on Sunday January 08, 2017 @12:34AM (#13348475)
Which I didn't say, I simply said it was unlikely. In fact, vanishingly unlikely because it relies on infinity.
Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by mannykannot on Sunday January 08, 2017 @09:51AM (#13349871)
You might not have written it in exactly those words, but the corollary of your observation still holds.
Re:Why anything? Why this? (1998) by naasking on Tuesday January 10, 2017 @08:27PM (#13370997)
Saying that an infinite hierarchy of functions is unlikely is saying that we probably don't live in a world governed by an infinite hierarchy of functions. But that's all it says, and as I pointed out, we have good a priori reasons for believing this conclusion, without having to ontologically commit ourselves to accepting it as necessarily true.

So I disagree, it's still not conflating "things that are likely" with "things that are".