I feel like the people claiming this is a smoking gun backdoor don't really understand what it means that Kaspersky's software is designed to proxy TLS. Yes: it is batshit that they proxy TLS. It's so batshit that this particular bug makes absolutely no sense as a backdoor. That idea is Xzibit-level crazy.
But even in the bizarro world --- which I do not concede that we live in but will briefly stipulate to --- where you would backdoor kernel AV software that looks at TLS plaintext solely to give people the ability to get access to TLS plaintext, this still doesn't make sense. They terminate TLS locally. They are the client to every TLS session originating from the machine. They don't need to create a noisy 32 bit certificate collision, so noticeable to the Internet it shows up in CT logs, to accomplish this task. They can backdoor TLS itself in a zillion plausibly deniable ways that would give network observers access to plaintext.
Which is all the more reason not to believe that it's enemy action.