Re:Kaspersky: SSL interception differentiates certificates w...
by Sir_Cmpwn on Tuesday January 03, 2017 @06:36PM
(#13314348)
What if they don't need control of the entire machine? Such a backdoor could be much more conspicuous. What if the NSL they were handed only called for intercepting TLS traffic as a means of surveillance?
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Re:Kaspersky: SSL interception differentiates certificates w...
by tptacek on Tuesday January 03, 2017 @06:41PM
(#13314379)
Ironically, the backdoor that provided access to the whole machine would be far less conspicuous than this one. That's the thing about the human cognitive bias towards narratives: RCE vulnerabilities in AV are found routinely, and don't land on the top of HN. This bug did because it was so cosmically stupid, it's surprising nobody noticed it before --- something Ormandy repeatedly states in his writeup.
Which is all the more reason not to believe that it's enemy action.
Re:Kaspersky: SSL interception differentiates certificates w...
by Sir_Cmpwn on Tuesday January 03, 2017 @08:05PM
(#13314815)
Well, I don't know much about Windows and I don't know much about the design of this software, but let's speculate some more. I imagine that on Windows, you have to have escalated permissions to modify the certificate store. I also imagine that if you were writing a piece of software that could do this (i.e. AV), you wouldn't always be running everything as root (so to speak). I would guess that most RCEs wouldn't lead to being able to modify the certifiate store.
Re:Kaspersky: SSL interception differentiates certificates w...
by tptacek on Tuesday January 03, 2017 @09:10PM
(#13315111)
It's kernel code.
Re:Kaspersky: SSL interception differentiates certificates w...
by Sir_Cmpwn on Tuesday January 03, 2017 @09:16PM
(#13315140)
Sure. Presumably not all of it is, though. I'm guessing most RCEs for this software don't happen in the kernel. Ring 0 RCE certainly does make the news, I would imagine.