Evidence of this phenomenon in the shuttle program was that foam shedding (insulation for the main fuel tank falling off during launch) was observed as early as 1983, and had been noted as a substantial risk many times over the years. Engineers pressed for high resolution images to inspect damage, but those requests were denied. NASA continued to "drive drunk" over the years, even after Challenger, and inevitably, disaster struck when Columbia was damaged by a piece of foam that broke off during launch, resulting in disintegration during reentry.[1] After grounding the fleet and improving safety, the very next launch suffered similar foam shedding, though from a different part of the tank. The launch after that was also pressed, after delays and objections from the chief engineer and safety officer.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaste...
You're absolutely right though about this being "Monday morning quarterbacking" with any analysis after the events. That said, two things are clear:
1. The most knowledgeable engineers were strongly against launch (see Ebeling and Boisjoly at Morton Thiokol)
2. There were huge statistical flaws made by decision makers at NASA before launch (see Feynman as noted in this thread)
Are you not falling victim to a sort of survivor-ship bias in only applying these analyses to 'failed' missions?
It seems obvious in hindsight that the 'whistle-blowers' were right, but how many people voiced concerns which turned out to be erroneous?