http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/roger...
The key items for me were:
1) While they had no expectation of erosion, and the design did not call for the o-rings to erode, once they observed them eroding, they retroactively invented a "margin of error" based on what fraction the o-rings eroded. This was not based on an actual understood process, and is akin to saying "well, the bridge didn't break when we drove that truck over it, so it must be okay"
2) The engineers actually knew the risk (~1% chance of loss per launch, not specific to the o-rings, compared with two actual losses of the shuttle over ~130 missions). Management used entirely invented numbers for the risk which were not justified.
[..] In spite of these variations from case to case, officials behaved as
if they understood it, giving apparently logical arguments to each
other often depending on the "success" of previous flights. For
example. in determining if flight 51-L was safe to fly in the face of
ring erosion in flight 51-C, it was noted that the erosion depth was
only one-third of the radius. It had been noted in an experiment
cutting the ring that cutting it as deep as one radius was necessary
before the ring failed. Instead of being very concerned that
variations of poorly understood conditions might reasonably create a
deeper erosion this time, it was asserted, there was "a safety factor
of three." This is a strange use of the engineer's term ,"safety
factor." If a bridge is built to withstand a certain load without the
beams permanently deforming, cracking, or breaking, it may be designed
for the materials used to actually stand up under three times the
load. This "safety factor" is to allow for uncertain excesses of load,
or unknown extra loads, or weaknesses in the material that might have
unexpected flaws, etc. If now the expected load comes on to the new
bridge and a crack appears in a beam, this is a failure of the
design. There was no safety factor at all; even though the bridge did
not actually collapse because the crack went only one-third of the way
through the beam. The O-rings of the Solid Rocket Boosters were not
designed to erode. Erosion was a clue that something was wrong.
Erosion was not something from which safety can be inferred.
His point about NASA's nonsensical use of the "safety factor" is not that you could drive over a bridge, and look, it didn't break, so it must be OK!It's even worse, you drive a truck over it, afterwards 1/3 of the steel is cracked, so you conclude that it must be able to safely accept 3x the weight. Nonesense! This is the sort of moronic engineering that killed the crew of the Challenger.
1. http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/roger...
Note that it wasn't even engineering, reading the story in full (it's great, and covers the software side for which Feynman had nothing but praise) Feynman repeatedly noted that engineers were fairly realistic[0] and had been ringing alarms pretty much all along, this was entirely manglement mangling.
[0] unless the spectre of manglement was involved, at least for some of them
Something which, as summarized by Feynman's quote above, should be patently obvious to any engineer as bullshit.
Feynman's appendix is the only part that even tries, but it doesn't go far enough through no fault of Feynman's, he had no resources to pursue this line of inquiry. It was a struggle just to get that appendix into the report.
They should have interviewed every single person in any way remotely involved in that O-ring decision, find out if they objected to it, and if they didn't what money/institutional/social obstacles there were to prevent that.
Did some engineer actually sign off on the aforementioned "safety factor"? We don't know, but somehow I doubt that's language management came up with on their own, and if they did that there was no way for an engineer to spot that and report "wtf? The system doesn't work like that!".
Reading between the lines some engineer actually did come up with that estimate, but likely that engineer was where he was because NASA had a culture of promoting mindless yes-men.
I meant Feynman's later recounting of the whole affair (in "What do you care what other people think"), rather than just the report.
> Did some engineer actually sign off on the aforementioned "safety factor"? We don't know, but somehow I doubt that's language management came up with on their own
That doesn't mean they were fed that by an engineer, only that they'd encountered the term before.
> and if they did that there was no way for an engineer to spot that and report "wtf? The system doesn't work like that!".
And then what? Upper-management uses "safety factor" in a completely bullshit manner, and engineer spots that (because they're masochistic and read management reports?), tells their direct manager it's inane, and then what, you think it's going to go up the chain to upper-management which will fix the issue? Because IIRC (I don't have my copy of What Do You Care on me so I can't check) Feynman noted that engineering systematically got lost somewhere along management ladder as one middle-manager decided not to bother their manager with a mere engineer (or worse, technician!)'s concern or suggestions.
> Reading between the lines some engineer actually did come up with that estimate, but likely that engineer was where he was because NASA had a culture of promoting mindless yes-men.
That's really not what I read behind the lines considering engineers had failure estimates in the % range and management had estimates in the per-hundred-thousand range.
I've read that too. You're dangerously close to getting me to re-read everything Feynman's written, again. I don't know whether to curse you or thank you :)
> And then what? [...]
I feel we're in violent agreement as to what the actual problem at NASA was, yes, I'm under no illusion that if some engineer had raised these issues it would have gone well for him. This is made clear in the opening words of Feynman's analysis,:
[...] It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the
probability of a failure with loss of vehicle and of human life. The
estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in 100,000. The higher
figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures from
management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of
agreement? Since 1 part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a
Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one, we could
properly ask "What is the cause of management's fantastic faith in the
machinery?"
I'm pointing out, not to disagree with you, but just to use your comment as a springboard, that to an outside observer this whole process led to some "moronic engineering". Engineering is the sum of the actual construction & design process and the management structure around it.The real flaw in the report is that it didn't explore how that came to be institutional practice at NASA, Feynman is the only one who tried.
> That's really not what I read behind the lines.
Regardless of what sort of dysfunctional management practices there were at NASA they couldn't have launched the thing without their engineers. If they were truly of the opinion that shuttle reliability was 3 orders of magnitude less than what management thought, perhaps they should have refused to work on it until that death machine was grounded pending review.
Of course that wouldn't have been easy, but it's our responsibility as engineers to consider those sorts of options in the face of dysfunctional management, especially when lives are on the line.
The real issue was that that's not how NASA presented it outwardly. I doubt that teacher that blew up with Challenger was told about her odds of surviving in those terms.
As human launch vehicles go I think the shuttle's reliability was fine. The reason I called it a death machine is that if you make a vehicle that explodes 1% of the time you better advertise that pretty thoroughly before people step on board. NASA didn't.
Seems like it was politically impossible for NASA to say outright that there was a 1% chance of failure for every launch -- it would have led to loss of public support for the Shuttle program. So we have a systems failure where both politicians and the public contributed by making NASA admins feel compelled to lie and cover up to make the launches work.
I mean, the courageous thing to do would be to stand up and say space travel is inherently risky, people might die, but it's still worth it. But courageous politicians regularly get voted out of office, and I would bet a courageous NASA admin who said that would end up fired.
Additionally, when you have a civilian on board, I think it really changes how you think about what an appropriate level of risk is (13% might have been ok with professional astronauts who knew the risks beforehand, but likely was too high for a civilian).
And the line engineers at Morton Thiokol fought back pretty hard on the decision, even if it might have impacted their careers negatively.
I wonder if you told the management that, in those words, if they would have still believed such a ludicrous idea.
Are you not falling victim to a sort of survivor-ship bias in only applying these analyses to 'failed' missions?
It seems obvious in hindsight that the 'whistle-blowers' were right, but how many people voiced concerns which turned out to be erroneous?
Evidence of this phenomenon in the shuttle program was that foam shedding (insulation for the main fuel tank falling off during launch) was observed as early as 1983, and had been noted as a substantial risk many times over the years. Engineers pressed for high resolution images to inspect damage, but those requests were denied. NASA continued to "drive drunk" over the years, even after Challenger, and inevitably, disaster struck when Columbia was damaged by a piece of foam that broke off during launch, resulting in disintegration during reentry.[1] After grounding the fleet and improving safety, the very next launch suffered similar foam shedding, though from a different part of the tank. The launch after that was also pressed, after delays and objections from the chief engineer and safety officer.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaste...
You're absolutely right though about this being "Monday morning quarterbacking" with any analysis after the events. That said, two things are clear:
1. The most knowledgeable engineers were strongly against launch (see Ebeling and Boisjoly at Morton Thiokol)
2. There were huge statistical flaws made by decision makers at NASA before launch (see Feynman as noted in this thread)
One should always think of denominators (really ratio of numerator over denominator).
In health, public heath in particular is "about denominators."
I grew up with stories of the Challenger after my father - a statistician - and 2 of his co-authors were selected by National Academy of Sciences to study if the danger could have been predicted beforehand. They showed that the likelihood of failure was 13% at the launch temperature, but would have been negligible if NASA had waited just a few hours. (His co-author, Ed Fowlkes, was dying of AIDS at the time - and considered this paper one of his life's great achievements)
Bad statistical inferences were a huge part of the launch story, and you can see more in Richard Feynman's critiques:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report
Secondly, the effect I highlight (a biased data sample) is a key issue with news/social media - and can lead us to heavily flawed inferences if we don't correct for it.
I'll dig deep into this in future posts with a substantial amount of data and visualizations.