MacOS FileVault2 Password Retrieval

Re:MacOS FileVault2 Password Retrieval by soneil on Friday December 16, 2016 @11:41AM (#13194474)

There was a similar, bar less dramatic, case in the UK recently - where police swiped the phone from the hands of a suspect as he took a call, and then kept interacting with the screen to keep it unlocked long enough to recover the evidence required.

In retrospect, it's a pretty obvious attack vector.

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Re:MacOS FileVault2 Password Retrieval by Someone on Friday December 16, 2016 @12:31PM (#13194972)

A dead man's switch with a very short time-out would make that kind of attack a lot harder.

For the extremely security-conscious, it could even be a kind of fail-deadly (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail-deadly) feature that wipes the phone.

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Re:MacOS FileVault2 Password Retrieval by tptacek on Friday December 16, 2016 @12:41PM (#13195073)

See, this is the problem with people's conception of FDE. This is actually a very silly solution to the problem.

The right approach is to recognize what FDE is good at (minimizing the risk that casual thieves will get data in addition to valuable parts, and protecting computers that can frequently be powered all the way off from even advanced attackers), and then use something better to protect sensitive data.

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Re:MacOS FileVault2 Password Retrieval by alexpoulsen on Friday December 16, 2016 @02:28PM (#13195998)

https://github.com/hephaest0s/usbkill Checks for changes with USB drives and shuts down the computer and optionally deletes files and wipes ram. USB stick on a wristband > unplugs when they take the computer > shuts down

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