Do you believe that the ontology of science, namely the fundamental entities of the standard model and general relativity, serve as the only valid foundation for all other ontologies encompassing the human experience?

That depends what you mean by "foundation". The fundamental entities of physics (still somewhat unknown) can be the ontic foundation for reality even though various other available ontologies genuinely reduce down to them or abstract over them in our special circumstances. The problem comes from claiming that the other ontologies are not merely effective theories but instead fundamental theories, at which point you're starting to make very contentious metaphysical claims and meta-philosophical claims about what you mean by "ontology" and even "exist".

Sure, those claims are often exactly those made in subdisciplines like metaphysics and plain-language philosophy, but they're still suspect in a way that, for instance, philosophy of science is not. Plain language is ambiguous and full of conceptual holes: everyone learns that. The difference in dealing with the sciences is that we try to ground all of our "sentences", as philosophers would say, in actions that an experimenter can actually perform in the real world.

When you start elevating "plain language" above the actions that actually cash it out, you start running into problems.

I haven't thought of ontologies in the plural; I think it resists multiplicity by definition? I expect to be able to chase secondary facts back into their basis in reality.

Anytime one attempts to abstract entities and features from reality in order to work with them - whether you're practicing philosophy, physics, medicine, writing laws, coding animal behavior, or describing a database schema, one must base one's work on an ontology whether it be implicit or explicit. Many ontologies exist - arguably at least as many ontologies exist as conscious entities capable of conceptualization.

Your second statement assumes the affirmative to the question I asked; that the ontology of science does indeed serve as the only valid foundation for all other ontologies, unless I'm missing something. Philosophers call this the theory of 'causal closure'[1] It has many implications that you may or may not agree with in the areas of consciousness, free will, ethics, etc.

[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_closure

Very interesting, thanks. I was thinking of logic as the foundation, but now I realize that I was actually thinking of a combination of logic and science.

Yes, and logic + various epistemological disciplines besides science give us valid knowledge in other domains.

I'm not sure about that. I was very persuaded by this essay, which makes exactly this distinction: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/89-CRITICAL-I...

I don't think Latour's criticism of social theory applies to the causal closure of physics, or science's claimed exclusivity to describe fundamental ontologies; it criticizes the approaches of 20th century post-modernist critique.

Are you familiar with his follow-up, 'Reassembling the Social'? I'm not, but in reading a summary it seems to propose better methods for comparing ontologies and systems.

It's been a long time since I read that. After posting the link, I reread it, and it seems I misinterpreted it somewhere along the way. I thought that it develops an opposition between "matters of fact" and "matters of concern", and that it breaks along the same lines of the discussion here, but it doesn't.