That depends what you mean by "foundation". The fundamental entities of physics (still somewhat unknown) can be the ontic foundation for reality even though various other available ontologies genuinely reduce down to them or abstract over them in our special circumstances. The problem comes from claiming that the other ontologies are not merely effective theories but instead fundamental theories, at which point you're starting to make very contentious metaphysical claims and meta-philosophical claims about what you mean by "ontology" and even "exist".

Sure, those claims are often exactly those made in subdisciplines like metaphysics and plain-language philosophy, but they're still suspect in a way that, for instance, philosophy of science is not. Plain language is ambiguous and full of conceptual holes: everyone learns that. The difference in dealing with the sciences is that we try to ground all of our "sentences", as philosophers would say, in actions that an experimenter can actually perform in the real world.

When you start elevating "plain language" above the actions that actually cash it out, you start running into problems.