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Re:Intel Security True Key by benchaney on Sunday December 04, 2016 @06:43PM (#13102403)
"Running an update where it pulls new code" is definitely an example of phoning home, and it opens the door to all sorts of vulnerabilities, such as the one featured in the Apple vs the FBI case.
Re:Intel Security True Key by twr on Sunday December 04, 2016 @08:14PM (#13102741)
Intel microcode updates on Linux are provided through regular distribution repositories. There is no phoning home feature.
Re:Intel Security True Key by benchaney on Sunday December 04, 2016 @08:40PM (#13102840)
Do they get updated when you run the package manager, or do they update automatically?
Re:Intel Security True Key by twr on Sunday December 04, 2016 @09:51PM (#13103062)
Binary packaging systems download microcode.dat (a text blob containing microcode) from Intel during the build process. Microcode.dat gets converted into an initramfs image that supplies the new microcode early in the system boot. Users download the built binary package, which then modifies the boot parameters of their system.

So normally only the build servers contact Intel. Source-based distributions may. But even then the source files are verified with cryptographic hashes (which are in turn signed by the maintainers' private keys).

Edit: I may have misread your question. I thought you were asking by implication if the microcode blob is pulled after the install. If not, then: No. Updates happen when the package manager decides.

https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/x86/early-microcode...

https://gitlab.com/iucode-tool/iucode-tool

https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/26400/Linux-Proces...

Re:Intel Security True Key by akerl_ on Sunday December 04, 2016 @09:01PM (#13102915)
Either via the package manager or via the user manually downloading and loading the microcode update of their choosing. For example: http://askubuntu.com/questions/545925/how-to-update-intel-mi...