Re:Flaws in deterministic password managers
by libeclipse on Thursday November 24, 2016 @02:21AM
(#13028806)
That doesn't matter. I could just put a full stop at the end of the string and call it a complex password. The point of it was for sites that require symbols. The complex password doesn't add a meaningful amount of entropy to a sufficiently long normal password; a 32 character normal password already has log2(16^32) = 128 bits of entropy.
We rely on the seed for security, the seed being the hash that scrypt spits out
Re:Flaws in deterministic password managers
by minitech on Thursday November 24, 2016 @03:18PM
(#13032512)
So it’s way too complicated for that purpose, then.
Re:Flaws in deterministic password managers
by libeclipse on Monday November 28, 2016 @03:21AM
(#13054128)
That's not an argument. Keep in mind that entropy is a property of password generation, not the result of the generation.
Re:Flaws in deterministic password managers
by minitech on Tuesday November 29, 2016 @05:02AM
(#13062058)
I mean, what do you want me to say? It is way too complicated. Why are you using a pre-shuffled character set and getting a permutation of it by index when the index is always extremely low compared to the number of permutations just to get some symbols in your password? Just base64-encode with a custom alphabet or something.
I never said anything about entropy, either.
The distribution of characters in “complex passwords” isn’t even?