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Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by tptacek on Monday November 21, 2016 @03:49PM (#13009069)
If you're doing any kind of radical political work --- left or right --- and are worried about the attention you're going to attract, don't use things like RISEUP.NET. You shouldn't be running mailing lists at all. You shouldn't be using Jabber and asking all your peers to enable encryption. These are fundamentally unsafe services, and the idea that they can be provided safely just by paying attention to network security is terribly misleading.

In the universe of possible media in which to conduct discussions with a group of peers, there may be none less safe than SMTP email mailing lists. Keep secrets off mailing lists. Never use mailing lists for secrets. Assume your mailing lists are public. Nobody is going to deploy a mailing list security solution that will ever be adequate against state-level adversaries. Any site claiming to keep political activists secure that offers mailing lists should be viewed with suspicion, because "don't use mailing lists" is close to the only thing that messaging security people agree about.

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by Raed667 on Monday November 21, 2016 @04:15PM (#13009280)
I remember clearly a Tunisian opposition party was using a RISEUP mailing list around 2006 to spread its articles, political statements, etc... (When they were banned before the revolution of 2011).

Not all politicians can/know how to operate anything more complex than an email account.

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by Cyph0n on Monday November 21, 2016 @06:19PM (#13010221)
That's an interesting piece of history. It kind of makes sense that accessibility can sometimes be worth the potential downsides.

By the way, are you a fellow Tunisian? I'm kind of surprised because I've never run into a Tunisian on HN :p

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by Raed667 on Tuesday November 22, 2016 @05:33AM (#13013109)
Maybe one day I'll release an archive of pre-2011 emails and IRC logs.

Yes I'm Tunisian, I only know of a couple active people around here, but there is a ton of readers.

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by Cyph0n on Tuesday November 22, 2016 @08:28AM (#13013935)
Wow, so you operated mail and IRC servers for use by dissidents pre-2011? I would definitely attend a talk about that! A blog post would be amazing too.

I see, that's great to hear. I don't live in Tunisia, so I'm not familiar with the Tunisian tech scene. Judging by your Twitter feed, it seems to be really active, which is awesome!

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by Raed667 on Tuesday November 22, 2016 @09:03AM (#13014160)
Nothing that impressive, I was just a bystander, I had a bot that logged IRC conversations on certain rooms and I subscribed to a number of mailing lists.

I just need to find the time to filter that data and publish something.

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by fritzy on Monday November 21, 2016 @11:54PM (#13011720)
We in the XMPP community work hard to make "Jabber" secure. Forward secrecy, federation and client scoring, carefully constructed extensions. But without end-to-end encryption like PGP or something, you're open to attack. There are some really neat specs that work on making this more transparent and better, but yes, you can't just blindly use someone else's service and go "it's secure."
Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by bruo on Monday November 21, 2016 @05:21PM (#13009772)
While you are not lying, and mailing lists should be avoided if you want to share secrets, most of the times you need a mailing lists not to do that, but to simplify communications.

At least in the global south, most of radical activists groups have strong "no-internet policies" for any type of secret, and no cellphones ones for their work. They have learned with their own history what they can or can't do, learned how to deal with IRL infiltration, and even learned how to communicate without any kind of contact or even agreements between groups. To survive and act against dictatorships or invading armies is not easy, they had to be smart.

But still, because travelling is expensive and networking today is a need for some of those groups or collectives, they can communicate with each other talking about their resolutions or activities, which are not secret (as I already said, it's assumed there can be a IRL infiltrate) but they are also not public.

You can see SMTP and mailing lists as a huge security risk, and they are, it's just not very common to see people that assume the opposite around here.

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by smonff on Wednesday November 30, 2016 @05:44AM (#13069715)
Also, sometimes, some activists can deliberately use a mailing list as a public expression channel because it is important that these things can be eared by everybody.

I see it as sticking posters in the street. There is no reasons to use Facebook or Google Groups for most of the Riseup (public) Lists users, not because they want something secret and hidden, but because they don't want to play with some companies rules and appreciate to be a part of a network run by volunteers more than to use profitable fake-free services.

Because it makes sense, not because it is more or less secure.

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by jakejnichols on Monday November 21, 2016 @04:41PM (#13009481)
Don't use things like RISEUP.NET. You shouldn't be running mailing lists at all. You shouldn't be using Jabber and asking all your peers to enable encryption.

So what are the types of services one should use?

Re:Tell HN: Riseup.net fails to update canary; fingerprints ... by dmix on Monday November 21, 2016 @05:28PM (#13009817)
Instead of looking for anti-authoritarian services to hide from authoritarian government services you should probably blend in with the fish like Mao said:

> The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.

It's better to create false identities that are seemingly legit and fully fleshed out, for example: with back stories, and utilize regular services as a normal person would. The key is disconnecting your own identity from the false one. Rather than trusting your security to a 3rd party service that makes a name for themselves on helping people trying to hide their identity, thereby attracting scrutiny.

That being said there are ways to use encryption services in a way to protect your communication but the bar for doing so is very high and most people will either make mistakes or get lazy. Fortunately services like Whatsapp and to a lesser extant Signal are so popular that you could easily blend in using them, while still having high-quality data encryption. Although they both use phone phone numbers for authentication and the device itself is always a weak-link which is why the identity part is so critical.

thegrugq posted an article a long time ago about how CIA agents in Lebanon [1] got caught because they used burner phones in a way that was unlike the way anyone else used cell phones, if I remember correctly: they were turned off the device most of the time except to make a few calls to other phones that were similarly not used often - not in the way normal people make calls. So anyone in control of the mobile operators would be able to ID potential evasive behaviour an zero-in on those devices/people for extra scrutiny.

That type of behavioural analysis that applies to real life can even more easily give you away in the digital world. Which is why it's important to not stand out from the crowd by using services like Riseup when your entire goal is privacy.

[1] http://grugq.github.io/blog/2013/03/12/anonymity-is-hard/