A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol

Re:A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol by lucb1e on Tuesday November 08, 2016 @08:51AM (#12900186)

That article is complete bullshit. I sent them a big email pointing out mistake after mistake and of course never got any response nor did they publish anything to correct their "journalism".

There are legitimate concerns with Telegram that I share with all other technically inclined people, but this article is like saying "use a firewalled Windows 95 instead" because something is wrong with Vista. You really should disregard everything they say because the true parts are too interwoven with fabrications.

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Re:A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol by moyta on Tuesday November 08, 2016 @09:19AM (#12900373)

Sure, I didn't look for an amazing article, just remember hearing about their homebrew "crypto" years ago and going eww.

This might be slightly better:

http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/130559/is-telegr...

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Re:A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol by gr3yh47 on Tuesday November 08, 2016 @09:38AM (#12900535)

You should provide some specific counterpoints and sources to back said points up - because rolling their own encryption is by itself reason enough not to use them. defaulting encryption to off is just icing on the cake

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Re:A Formal Security Analysis of the Signal Messaging Protocol by bascule on Tuesday November 08, 2016 @01:48PM (#12902857)

Let's see, what does the article say?

- Telegram isn't end-to-end encrypted per default: true

- Telegram uses homebrew encryption (MTproto): true

- Telegram presence information, at one point, could be read by someone who isn't your contact: true

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