News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Cryptanalysis of Enigma by nbadg on Tuesday November 01, 2016 @02:51PM (#12848998)
Well, also its susceptibility to both known-plaintext attacks and statistical analysis, though it depends a bit if you're talking about the army version of the enigma or the navy version. Also until very late versions, the machine couldn't map a letter to itself, which was another critical vulnerability.

The actual keyspace was around 76 bits [1], which is fairly respectable, particularly for the mid-20th century. Much of the weakness was, in fact, the result of the Enigma being an early device in a nascent technological field -- ie, the result of failures in the Enigma's design, as well as procedures surrounding its operation (not just operator error; for example, Polish cryptanalysts used the procedural repeating of the rotor setting initialization (it's conceptually similar to an initialization vector in modern crypto) to break early versions of the machine as early as 1932.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enigma_machine#Details

Re:Cryptanalysis of Enigma by VLM on Tuesday November 01, 2016 @04:52PM (#12849909)
Another early device problem was the threat model post WWII is of course nations will put up a near Manhattan Project level of effort which turns out to be just enough to break it, everyone knows that.

Pre WWII of course, they figured if a PHD mathematician couldn't crack it in a couple hours with chalk and chalkboard, well, surely they'll just give up, right?

The ratio of optimism to pessimism was a bit off.

Re:Cryptanalysis of Enigma by jacquesm on Tuesday November 01, 2016 @05:26PM (#12850169)
> The ratio of optimism to pessimism was a bit off.

Not much has changed then.