Sure but UPNP just opens up the outbound connection no?
A command and control connection for a botnet would still need an inbound NAT rule as would the ability to get the IoT device on the LAN in the first place compromise it right? Or am I missing something?
NATs allow outbound connections by default; UPnP opens up incoming connections.
Oh I see the UPnP IGP AddPortMapping. Do the Merkai access that UPnP profile out of the box?
My understanding of UPNP is that it allows the router itself to become a discover-able device on the network. Then the IoT device connects to the router and adds a static port mapping from the router's public IP address on a specific port to the IoT's private IP address. The NAT still works as it normally does where any packets that try to leave the network get remapped by the router seamlessly. The danger in this case is the IoT device has a listening port on your public IP address, allowing attackers to connect directly to it through your router.
Why do you say that? AFAIK the devices being infected by Mirai use UPnP to expose themselves so the router probably has no responsibility for the insecurity. It would be great if we could build some sort of immune system into home routers and force IOT companies to pay for it, but that doesn't seem likely.
Short of mass-bricking these devices, any solution is going to be incredibly labor-intensive and expensive.