The presentations motivation and conclusions are indeed very high level. The body of the presentation presented several different applications, including Zcash and several applications of Proof-Carrying Data (the extensions of SNARKs), to exemplify this. Unfortunately not could be described in detail, but they all have corresponding technical detailed papers (see http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/publications.html).
Regarding the conclusion, patcon's interpretation is accurate, and more generally: There are numerous situation where parties cannot cooperate due to mistrust, and modern cryptography, SNARK included, allows them to use digital cryptographic schemes instread of certifications, accountants etc.
About the hash functions: collision resistance is discussed in the paper, but note that such algebraic/combinatoric/geometric hash functions are a totally different animal from SHA etc. The latter are much more efficient, but completely heuristic, whereas the former often have security proofs that relate them to well-established computational hardness assumptions.
The internet used to provide low-barrier super-human communication abilities, but only in very limited contexts -- possibly beside a giant mainframe, and only able to talk with other giant mainframes. Now that we have instant comms in our pockets and on our wrists all the time, the effects are pretty expansive. Blockchains are not yet ubiquitous, but when they are (in every device and underlying many services we use), every person will have the infrastructure to create and maintain complex agreements for near-zero costs. (Financial agreements and otherwise.) This will be pretty transformative.
I assume ZCash is acknowledging that privacy is a critical piece of that transformation in organizational structure for society. Kinda like how ubiquitous communications are almost pointless without the possibility of E2E encryption.
But this is a lot of speculation given that I haven't read the linked article ;)
Sorry, but this is wishful thinking. The simple question about how you can enforce agreements running in blockchains can't be answered. In the real world you have the military or police force while in the blockchain itself you are pretty limited. On the other hand external oracles are the weakest part of the blockchain system. If they are hacked you hacked the agreements.
I think the blockchain/cryptocurrency/smart-contracts/app-coin scene is really exciting but the connection with the real world is problematic, more when the financial institutions are enforcing AML/KYC/etc
Check out https://www.augur.net/ for an attempt at answering that question. They crowdsource the outcomes of the various bets from people holding REP tokens. REP holders have a financial incentive to act honestly to increase or maintain the value of their REP.
Also, we don't know yet how public blockchains (where Augur runs) work with State or powerful actor attacks, when the incentives are not purely financial.
Sure, that's the traditionally accepted way to go about solving the problem in the real world. But there are many other ways to solve the same problems that we're all intimately familiar with by now based around reputation systems. When it becomes public that a counterparty to a contract has engaged in delinquency, they suffer a reputational hit. If their reputation has value (and there is nothing about pseudonymous entities that mean that they cannot accrue reputational value, rating systems work on darknet markets quite well and have since their inception), and the amount of damage to their reputation is higher cost than making good on the contract, then they will make good on the contract (and even if they can't, you've punished their delinquency by damaging their reputation, instead of dragging them through an expensive inefficient corrupt legal system involving violence as the final sanction).
All sharing economy and peer to peer systems that currently exist work on systems of this kind, and cryptocurrencies to the extent that reputations are valued and contracts made similarly so, and this will only become more prevalent as time goes by.
Not everything requires recourse to violence.
You could use transparency to tell how much a given escrow agent is holding and don't use them if it approaches the value of their reputation. And/or use a system where they don't hold the funds, they merely choose to unlock a transaction to pay to A or B.
That should be embraced and noted, and where appropriate migrated to, not pushed aside because there is a rapidly decreasing class of problems not suited to resolution with this model.
The default rate on BTCJam, which was one of the first loan services is 10%, this doesn't compare well with mainstream rates however, Bitlendingclub is supposedly one third of that, which compares favourably to mainstream rates https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRCLACBS
From a product value perspective, that's a pretty big deal for the illegal commerce side of the Bitcoin market. Which I would guess is some double-digit share of Bitcoin (currently $11B). That use alone could make Z-cash a billion dollar product.
As a side effect, that could increase the proportion of Bitcoin transactions that are legal, which might have some nice legitimizing effects on the brand.
Huh? Why? How? It's an altcoin with more anonymity than Bitcoin. That's nice, but no big deal.
I went to hear Tromer's talk on the theory behind Zcash at Stanford last Wednesday.[1] There were a lot of very strong claims and a lot of hand-waving. I'm not an expert in that area, but the claims were awfully strong and the presentation didn't back them up sufficiently. Here's his key paper.[2] He claims, at least, to have developed a new way to generate cryptographically strong hash functions. See section 1.1 of that paper. That's a hard problem. Of the existing crypto-grade hash functions, Snefru, MD2 (128-bit), MD4, MD5, RIPEMD, HAVAL-128, and SHA-0 have all been broken, and SHA-1 is looking weak. Solving that problem alone would be a noteworthy achievement. So where's Tromer's proposed hash function, evaluated by the crypto community?
On the financial front, the insiders take a 20% rakeoff of new Zcash coins for the first four years. That's a huge cut for a financial product. The investors include Roger Ver, the convicted felon who publicly said Mt. Gox was sound. What could possibly go wrong?
[1] http://web.stanford.edu/class/ee380/ [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/580.pdf