Bureaucracy: "We can't let you build this. It doesn't satisfy requirement IXX.53-A."

Engineer: "The one about the primary turboencabulator?"

Bureaucracy: "Yes. Your reactor needs it to be certified to the standards laid out in Index 437."

Engineer: "There aren't any turboencabulators in the design. Our design uses retroencabulators. That's how it's so safe; the primary turboencabulator was the primary failure point. There is no primary turboencabulator to certify."

Bureaucracy: "I'm sorry, but we can't accept this design without a certification for a primary turboencabulator. It can't be safe without one. Maybe you should start over?"

Thing is though, how can the engineer claim this new retroencabulator is safe?

If he has documented tests etc, how about going the route of getting the paperwork amended? And if not, should the bureaucrats just take his word that this time it is safe? That was what they were saying with the turboencabulator as well...

I think the problem the parent was getting at is that parts new enough that regulations have not been written are automatically non-viable due to bureaucracy substituting outsourced regulation documents for in-house technical expertise. With the end result of regulators being incapable of making technical decisions that fall outside the already written regulated scenarios.

I would hope that this is less of an issue in nuclear regulation, due to them hopefully having engineering resources on staff. But I do know it's a common problem with less technically focused branches of government.