Worst case: Pacific Gas and Electric before and after deregulation. Before deregulation as a public utility, a century of modest profits and modest CEO pay. After deregulation, wildly volatile profits ending in bankruptcy three years after deregulation, and much higher CEO pay.
I'll try and remember the name of UK CEO that successfully extracted £200m in incentive based remuneration over a ten year service. A service that saw the share price boom in early years, then by the end of the 10 years crash to below the starting price.
If you get 10% returns, that's $1.25M for you (at a possibly low tax rate, too) plus $40k on your own investment. If you lose 20%, you're out $80k. What's your incentive here?
That's the intended effect. You missed the point. Read woopwoop's comment again.
woopwoop is saying that the equity compensation given to CEOs is a disincentive for taking risks and that it needs to be offset by a promised severance package in order to increase the variance of outcomes.
amluto is saying that this is a mischaracterization of the equity compensation for CEOs, which only exposes them to gains and not losses and thus they are already incentivized to pursue a risky strategy (e.g. golden parachutes are not required to create this incentive).
amluto is saying CEOs are exposed only to gains and not losses, which is agreeing with woopwoop without realizing it.
The reason a BoD/shareholders would want to set up a CEO with such an arrangement is because the much wealthier shareholders are well-diversified and risk-seeking (they don't depend on their income from this one company to feed their family)- while the CEO is not as diversified, he DOES depend on his compensation from this one company to feed his family- so if the BoD/shareholders expect him to take risks, then he needs to be protected from the consequences of those risks.
Except that their investors will flee (cash out) and they'll not be getting any management fees next quarter.
Also, apparently having a famously bad investment track record doesn't make it much harder to raise money for a new fund in the future. If I remember right, the LTCM managers kept right on going after LTCM blew up.
I strongly disagree. A CEO is probably highly personally invested in the company, but that investment almost always has an unusual structure: it resembles a call option, not equity. If a CEO generates a large gain over the course of a few years, the CEO makes a lot of money. In contrast, if the CEO generates a large loss over the course of a few years, the CEO loses very little. This can give a CEO an incentive to make extremely risky decisions because the CEO doesn't personally suffer much more from a huge loss to the company than from a small loss to the company.
This problem exists for investment managers. In a hedge fund that charges a performance fee on investment gains, managers have a perverse incentive to take large risks. It gets more pronounced if the fund is already down for the year: if, say, the fund has taken a 40% loss, it can look very attractive to the manager to bet all of the remaining assets on a coin flip. Heads, they get their bonus. Tails, they now have a 90% loss, but they weren't getting their bonus either way and they lose nothing.
Edit: At least the coin flip is neutral on expectation. But the same issue exists for a bet with negative expected value: the manager gets some benefit if they get very lucky, so the manager has positive expected value even if the fund has very negative expected value from their decision.