NIST (among many others) has recommended you stop using SMS for MFA: https://threatpost.com/nist-recommends-sms-two-factor-authen...
In any case, I have 1Password generate pronounceable passwords specifically to avoid the problem of the rep trying to compare random alphanumeric strings. 1Password can even generate random phrases of N words (e.g. xkcd passwords) which works well for this sort of thing because it's easy to say those over a phone.
This is kinda the point though. We can cook up the most elaborate security scheme in the world, but ultimately the keys to our accounts lie with under trained, minimum-wage call center employees.
(EDIT: and hey, I've done some grinding minimum-wage bullshit jobs, I completely understand)
[1] https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2016/06/your-m...
>With Verizon on the phone, it was a fairly simple matter to re-reset the portal password, set an account PIN to prevent attacker re-entry and un-do the phone forward.
One take away is how SMS as 2FA depends on a flawed assumption. The other I found cute is using random strings as answers to the stupid account recovery questions companies continue to ask.
Things not mentioned in the blog is exactly what personal information the attacker had, that authenticated him to Verizon. PIN? Some portion of his SSN? It must not have been account recovery questions because the target of the attack used random strings as answers.