Many would argue that this is the more flawed design.

It is probably worse to have an unreliable indicator light than it is to not have any indicator light at all.

That would only inform the user that the camera is on, and that isn't good enough. If the user is paying active attention to the computer then they can take action, but if they're not then they can't - noticing an LED has switched on when you're busy doing something else in the same room is quite unlikely. Even if you're actively using the computer you could miss it if you're focused on a task.

A hardware switch that disables the camera or a lens cover that blocks it entirely (eg tape) are the only safe options.

All a light does is inform you that the camera is active. That is not a defence. It doesn't tell you that you've been hacked because an attacker might not access the camera (a mic and data are still accessible), and the camera light might activate if you haven't been hacked (eg any piece of software that you're using might result in the camera activating regardless of whether you want it to or not) which would lead to many false positives and as a consequence people would ignore the light.

A light is only information, and any amount of information won't stop an attack. Information is only available after you've been attacked, so you haven't stopped or mitigated the problem. A hardware solution that stops people accessing the camera mitigates the result of an attack before it happens. That's why it's much better. You just have to remember that blocking the camera only stops attacks that use the camera. You still need to be diligent about other attack surfaces.

If you just block the camera you won't know that your computer is being hacked. The piece of tape isn't going to stop the hacker from doing much. Knowing my computer is hacked is far more important than stopping the attackers from seeing me.

If you have a false positive that is also very concerning and should be dealt with. At the very least I can put a piece of tape over the camera after the light turns on, if I believe it's a false positive.

At which point it's already too late - the hacker has had access to your camera for some period of time, until you notice the light. If you're interested in stopping people seeing you then you've failed. Putting a hardware block on the camera (eg tape) before you're hacked means that the hacker won't ever get access to your camera to see you.

The hardware block is about stopping people accessing your camera. It has no effect on anything else.

Regardless of what you do with your camera you still have to defend against other ways you can be hacked.

Yeah for like 10 seconds. Who cares? The problem with webcams is they can spy on you for days and weeks on end, and record your sensitive conversations.

"Hey Siri" works on desktop devices: https://9to5mac.com/2016/07/15/how-to-enable-hands-free-hey-...

"Okay Google" was removed from desktop: http://www.theverge.com/2015/10/16/9553051/ok-google-removed...

I think that having the mic light always on when you enable voice activation, would go a long way to showing consumers the risks of it. It makes it visually obvious that you are being recorded.

That's the whole point.

When you go to Skype you have to flip it before audio/video works - and then once the webcam is no longer "in use" it flips the hardware switch so that it can't be triggered (as the user is not going to want to re-trigger it, nor is likely to remember to do so)

Your average computer has a lot of LEDs active anytime it's plugged into the wall (let alone running) - what protection will yet another LED offer to your average consumer?