When... did I say that? I said: a file write primitive on a server is fairly common. e.g. a PHP web app that lets you upload a file to some directory on the server. An attacker could use such a feature to upload a .so file to load into mysqld.
I'm just arguing that the title of RCE is accurate here. In a non-trivial amount of configurations you can abuse this vulnerability to remotely compromise a machine you otherwise couldn't get a shell on. Hence RCE.
I can see this leading to RCE in a number of scenarios:
- default/abandoned mysql install with default root creds. If you also have a file write primitive on the server (which IS common in LAMP stacks), now you can get RCE with it.
- mysql install with weak superuser creds that you've bruteforced. If you also have a file write primitive on the server (which IS common in LAMP stacks), now you can get RCE with it.
- db superuser uses the same db password as the app's connection. If you also have a file write primitive on the server (which IS common in LAMP stacks), now you can get RCE with it.
Are these super-common scenarios? No, but they are most certainly out there. Yes, you can say "this obvious mitigation would have prevented it", but that doesn't change the facts. You can abuse this in some set of circumstances to get RCE, so "RCE" is an accurate label, and THAT'S ALL I'M SAYING.
This is an important issue to consider, but it has been WAY overblown as presented here.
To be perferctly clear: if you are running mysql in your production stack, you are most likely NOT affected by this whole ordeal at all. Now, with the initial panick blown off, please read the article and assess wether you are one of the few affected users out there or not (in short: only worry if you have regular users with the FILE privilege enabled).
Spreading FUD doesn't help anybody...